On Monday, August 10th, global trade policy once again became a crucial variable in cross-asset pricing. However, unlike the previous reliance on large-scale administrative measures to quickly adjust tariffs, Washington's current trade policy is clearly shifting towards a tiered approach based on trade law investigations, industry reviews, and negotiation mechanisms. Meanwhile, the conflict in the Middle East continues to impact energy supply expectations. Brent crude oil was last trading around $84.80 per barrel, well below its April high, but energy prices remain a significant disruptive factor to inflation and policy expectations. The market thus faces a new combination of variables: energy risks have not completely subsided, and tariff policies have not been withdrawn; rather, they have shifted from sudden shocks to a more complex and institutionalized implementation path. On February 20th of this year, the US Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act did not authorize the president to directly impose tariffs. This ruling did not change the trade protection policy itself, but rather its implementation path. With the policy tools that could have quickly covered large quantities of imported goods through states of emergency now restricted, trade policy has begun to rely more heavily on the authorizations granted by Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. This means the market needs to rethink the concept of tariff risk. Previously, the risk mainly stemmed from the suddenness of policy announcements; now it comes more from investigation procedures, the scope of applicable laws, product exemptions, and whether different tariffs can be combined. The speed of policy shocks has decreased, but the institutional complexity has increased significantly. In March of this year, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) initiated a Section 301 investigation into structural overcapacity in the manufacturing sector, involving the EU, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, India, and several Southeast Asian economies, covering a wide range of manufacturing industries including automobiles, batteries, chemicals, electronics, machinery, semiconductors, steel, and shipbuilding. Hearings were held in May, thus moving the investigation from policy statement to formal legal proceedings. On July 23, the USTR completed another round of Section 301 investigations, imposing new additional tariffs on 60 trading partners. According to the final proposal, some economies will face a 10% tariff, while most others will face 12.5%. The EU, Japan, South Korea, and Switzerland will be subject to a capped tariff rate combined with the Most Favored Nation (MFN) rate. This measure covers approximately 99.4% of US imports, but exempts certain raw materials, goods in short supply, and goods already subject to Section 232. This design deserves close attention from trading markets because it demonstrates that the current policy objective is not simply to pursue uniformly high tariffs, but rather to find a balance between tariff pressure and supply chain stability. For example, if the additional tariffs lead to insufficient domestic supply of key raw materials, related products may be excluded; goods already subject to Section 232 tariffs will not be mechanically subject to another layer of tariffs. This arrangement reduces the overall cost shock but increases policy differentiation between industries. In other words, future tariff assessments cannot rely solely on nominal tariff rates; they must also consider the scope of applicable goods, rules of origin, exemption lists, and the cross-relationships between different legal instruments. Another noteworthy change comes from Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. On July 20, the United States announced an additional 50% tariff on certain Canadian automobiles, alcoholic beverages, dairy products, and other goods. These measures did not take effect immediately but were planned to be implemented from August 19, with exemptions for energy, potash fertilizer, certain key minerals, and goods already subject to Section 232 tariffs. From a market mechanism perspective, this design has a clear negotiating nature. The high tariff rate initially creates a deterrent effect, but the delayed implementation date leaves a window for negotiation between the two sides. Therefore, the published tariff rate does not necessarily equate to the final implemented tariff rate. This model may be more noteworthy than a single, sudden tariff increase because it breaks down market risk into several stages: investigation initiation, preliminary determination, announcement of tariff rates, delayed implementation, negotiation, and final execution. Each stage can potentially alter corporate cost expectations. Similar characteristics are emerging in the EU's approach. On July 23, US Trade Representative Greer publicly stated that recent regulatory and industrial policy disputes are increasing uncertainty in transatlantic trade relations. Combined with the ongoing Section 301 investigation into structural excess capacity, whether existing trade arrangements can continue to constrain new tariffs has become a new institutional issue. For financial markets, the most important aspect of tariff policy is not political rhetoric, but rather the three transmission chains. The first is the cost chain. If tariffs cover capital goods, intermediate goods, or components, they first affect import costs and corporate profit margins before potentially transmitting to end prices. Different industries have significantly different import dependencies, so asset performance is prone to industry-specific differentiation rather than simply a uniform change in risk appetite. The second is the inflation chain. Currently, Brent crude oil is still trading above $80 per barrel, and inflationary pressures on the energy sector have not yet been fully eliminated. In this context, if new tariffs further increase the cost of goods, the market's sensitivity to inflation stickiness and the Federal Reserve's policy path may increase. July inflation data is about to be released, and the market is currently digesting three variables simultaneously: energy prices, employment changes, and trade costs. The third factor is the supply chain. Current tariff policies already include numerous exemptions and differentiated treatments, indicating that policymakers also need to avoid sudden disruptions to the supply of key commodities. Therefore, what is more worthy of observation going forward is not whether tariffs will continue to be used, but rather which industries will be included, which goods will be exempted, and whether companies will change their actual tax burden by adjusting their procurement sources. From this perspective, trade policy has shifted from a single macroeconomic shock to a highly industry-specific pricing factor.