Twenty-three weeks have passed since the US military strike against Iran, and the situation in the Middle East remains tense and volatile, with the stability of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz continuing to affect global energy and market sentiment. The complex geopolitical conflicts have made the already challenging task of inflation assessment by central banks worldwide even more difficult. Beyond the energy inflation disturbances caused by geopolitical conflicts, the super El Niño weather phenomenon of 2026 is becoming a new core variable hindering the global fight against inflation. Its impact has long since transcended agricultural production, profoundly impeding the core objectives of major central banks worldwide to suppress inflation and stabilize prices. I. Super El Niño: Systemic Climate Risks to the Global Economy El Niño is a typical climate phenomenon caused by abnormally warming Pacific Ocean waters, significantly increasing the probability of global floods, extreme droughts, heat waves, and wildfires. This current El Niño, which began in 2026 and will continue into the following year, is highly likely to be the strongest in decades, causing widespread shocks to the entire global supply chain. This extreme weather will not only severely damage global crop cultivation and livestock farming, but also disrupt international shipping routes, destroy fishery resources, and affect global hydropower capacity, creating a comprehensive supply-side shock. The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that if multilateral financial institutions and humanitarian organizations cannot provide timely funding and relief assistance to vulnerable countries, the global economy may lose $686 billion in the coming year; over the next five years, the cumulative economic loss could reach as high as $3.1 trillion. The current global food system is already very fragile, and it has long been under multiple cost pressures, including rising tariff barriers, global fertilizer shortages, and energy shocks caused by geopolitical wars. The arrival of El Niño will further exacerbate the food supply crisis and continue to fuel global inflation over the next 6 to 12 months. In some vulnerable regions with weak infrastructure and low food self-sufficiency, extreme weather could even trigger widespread famine and food shortages. Ricky Volpe, a professor of agricultural business at California State Polytechnic University, said, "The economic impact of El Niño is phased and delayed, but it will eventually come and is inevitable." Due to the highly uncertain nature of climate patterns, the market finds it difficult to accurately predict the specific economic impact of El Niño. Currently, global analysts are focusing on the four major staple food categories: wheat, soybeans, rice, and corn, which account for nearly two-thirds of human calorie intake. While some regions may benefit from climate change and experience a slight increase in production, preliminary data from core staple food producing areas are not optimistic. Significantly reduced rainfall in Australia, a major wheat exporter, is putting pressure on global wheat trade supply; India, a major rice producer, has also warned that this year's monsoon climate is expected to be drier than usual, likely suppressing rice production. Karen Hendricks, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, points out that before this El Niño event, global food reserves were relatively abundant, which was the only positive factor stabilizing global food prices. However, affected by supply chain disruptions due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, global food prices remain near 70-year highs, with people's actual purchasing power continuing to decline and the pressure to ensure basic needs rising. II. Global Inflation Divergence: Poor Countries Bear the Heaviest Pressure, Developed Economies Cannot Remain Unaffected The inflationary impact of El Niño exhibits a clear national divergence, with tropical low- and middle-income countries being the main victims of this climate crisis. Ecuador, Peru, Indonesia, and Malaysia will bear the vast majority of economic losses. Countries heavily reliant on Middle Eastern fertilizer imports are particularly vulnerable, as rising fertilizer prices have forced local farmers to adjust their planting plans and face severe production choices. Jennifer Klap, a professor at the University of Waterloo and a member of the international expert group on sustainable food systems, analyzed that rising fertilizer prices have already increased the burden on agricultural production. Coupled with the destructive effects of El Niño's extreme weather events, the global food production and supply situation will further deteriorate. For impoverished countries with insufficient food self-sufficiency, reduced domestic crop yields will force governments to increase food imports, further pushing up domestic prices. Since food expenditures constitute a very high proportion of household disposable income in low-income countries, rising food prices will directly squeeze residents' basic living space. The latest data from the United Nations World Food Programme shows that 13 countries, including Sudan, Nigeria, Myanmar, and Lebanon, have been listed as "hunger hotspots," with approximately 266 million people facing severe food insecurity. Armed conflict is the core trigger for the food crisis, while economic shocks, reduced foreign aid, and El Niño have further amplified the crisis risks. Even developed economies, where residents' food expenditures account for a smaller proportion of their income, cannot completely avoid the impact of inflation. Klap stated that inflation triggered by El Niño is a global problem; the only difference lies in the degree of impact. Taking the United States as an example, low-income groups in the country are most acutely aware of food inflation, and persistent price increases can easily trigger public discontent and social pressure. III. The Impact of El Niño on China's Inflation and Economy In the global inflation transmission chain, China also faces dual pressures from El Niño, with two core pathways: domestic climate disturbances and imported inflation. Several domestic securities firms, meteorological institutions, and macroeconomic research teams have released special assessment reports on the impact of this super El Niño on China's prices and supply chains. Overall, domestic inflationary pressures are generally controllable, but structural price increases in specific product categories pose significant risks. From the perspective of domestic climate impacts, monitoring data from the National Climate Center of the China Meteorological Administration confirms that this strong El Niño will lead to a typical "drought in the north and floods in the south" abnormal climate pattern in China. Excessive rainfall and increased flood risk in southern river basins will directly impact the production and harvesting of fresh agricultural products such as rice and vegetables in the south; frequent high temperatures and droughts in the north will disrupt the growth of autumn grains, affecting the yields of autumn crops such as corn and miscellaneous grains. Meanwhile, extreme high temperatures will significantly increase the overall electricity load, and uneven spatial and temporal distribution of precipitation will lead to fluctuations in hydropower output, forcing an increase in thermal power consumption, raising the overall electricity production cost, and indirectly pushing up industrial and residential costs. From the perspective of food and inflation fundamentals, my country's staple food security is solid, with rice and wheat self-sufficiency rates at extremely high levels, effectively resisting the direct impact of global climate-induced production reductions, and the basis for comprehensive inflation does not exist. However, my country's agricultural product import structure has significant shortcomings; soybean dependence is close to 80%, and palm oil and industrial sugar are almost entirely dependent on overseas imports. Once core production areas in South America and Southeast Asia experience significant production reductions due to El Niño, rising international commodity prices will be transmitted to the domestic market through trade channels, pushing up the prices of edible oil and industrial feed, and subsequently leading to price increases in end-consumer goods such as meat and poultry. Quantitative calculations by several domestic securities firms show that, under extreme scenarios, this round of El Niño will at most increase my country's CPI by 0.13 percentage points year-on-year, and will not trigger a sharp jump in inflation, with the overall inflation trend remaining stable. However, price fluctuations in specific categories such as fresh vegetables, cooking oil, sugar, and livestock products will increase significantly, and structural price pressures cannot be ignored. At the monetary policy level, domestic macroeconomic research has listed the super El Niño as a key risk factor for price increases in the second half of the year, consistent with the assessment logic of central banks in India, Peru, and other countries. Relying on its massive national grain reserves and central reserve meat adjustment mechanism, China can effectively offset short-term supply disruptions caused by extreme weather and stabilize market expectations. However, a potential risk lies in the fact that if global food, energy, and industrial metal prices continue to rise, external inflationary pressures will raise domestic price expectations, constraining the scope for easing domestic monetary policy. IV. Global Central Bank Dilemmas and Monetary Policy Challenges In a macroeconomic research report released at the end of July, Deutsche Bank macro strategist Henry Allen pointed out that persistently rising food inflation will raise long-term market inflation expectations, creating inflation stickiness. This is the core challenge for global central banks in controlling prices; if out of control, it will trigger a vicious cycle of wage-price spirals. Central banks in Peru, Colombia, India, and other countries have explicitly mentioned the inflationary risks posed by El Niño in official documents and public statements, and more central banks are expected to follow suit with warnings. The Reserve Bank of India announced on August 5, 2026, that it would maintain its interest rate unchanged. Governor Sanjay Malhotra stated after the meeting that abnormal rainfall caused by El Niño remains the core risk to domestic inflation, and that sufficient food reserves and proactive supply control are key means to offset climate-induced inflation. Henry Allen further analyzed that some central banks may raise interest rates to curb inflation and inflation expectations in the future, but monetary policy cannot fundamentally address the supply shocks caused by extreme weather. If countries rely on fiscal subsidies to offset price pressures, inflation risks will transfer to government balance sheets, increasing sovereign debt risks. Historical data shows that sharp increases in food prices are often accompanied by regional conflicts, social unrest, and escalating geopolitical frictions, possessing strong spillover risks. Overall, inflation is a market "fire" that global central banks are trying to extinguish, and the super El Niño is continuously adding fuel to the fire. For investors betting on a soft landing for the global economy, climate risk has become an undeniable macroeconomic variable. V. The Structural Impact of El Niño on Future US CPI Based on the latest research reports from several authoritative overseas institutions, including Deutsche Bank, the IMF, and Goldman Sachs, in 2026, the impact of this super El Niño on the US CPI is characterized by mildness, lag, and structural differentiation. It will not cause runaway inflation, but it will delay the decline in US inflation and disrupt the pace of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy easing. From a fundamental perspective, the weight of food in the US CPI is only 10%–15%, far lower than in developing countries, naturally weakening the impact of food price fluctuations on overall inflation. At the same time, the warm winter brought by El Niño is beneficial to the production of wheat and corn in the main US producing areas, with relatively stable domestic staple food production and a low risk of significant production reduction, effectively offsetting the negative impact of global food production cuts. However, the lagged structural inflationary pressure remains significant, with the impact concentrated in the late 2026 to the first half of 2027, and a transmission cycle of approximately 6 to 12 months. On the one hand, the US is highly dependent on imports for agricultural products such as soybeans, palm oil, and sugar. Reduced production in major producing regions of South America and Southeast Asia will push up international commodity prices, which will then be transmitted to the US edible oil, processed food, and livestock feed sectors, ultimately raising the prices of meat, poultry, and eggs, and increasing the month-on-month increase in the food CPI. On the other hand, El Niño-induced extreme weather events have led to insufficient hydropower output, shifting global energy demand towards fossil fuels such as natural gas and coal. Coupled with geopolitical energy disturbances, this continues to support the US energy CPI, offsetting the benefits of declining energy prices. Unified calculations by institutions indicate that this strong El Niño may push up the overall US CPI by 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points year-on-year. Although the core CPI will be less directly impacted, persistent food and energy cost pressures will constrain the decline in core goods and services prices, solidifying inflation stickiness. For the Federal Reserve, the unexpected resilience of inflation will delay the market's anticipated interest rate cut window, significantly increasing the uncertainty of a soft landing for the US economy. The current risks in the United States are not a full-blown inflation rebound, but rather a slowdown in the rate of inflation decline and the difficulty in quickly restoring long-term inflation expectations, which will continue to constrain monetary policy for some time to come.