Currently, inflation has been plaguing the US economy for over five years, with the inflation rate consistently exceeding the Federal Reserve's core policy target of 2%, and currently approaching 4%, double the policy target. This persistently out-of-control price pressure led to the most significant voting division at this week's Federal Reserve meeting in nearly a decade. The Federal Reserve ultimately voted 9-3 to maintain its benchmark interest rate. Newly appointed Fed Chairman Kevin Warsh led the majority of members in adopting a wait-and-see approach, hoping to await more economic data to confirm whether inflation would continue to cool. Benefiting from the decline in international oil prices, US prices saw their first drop since the outbreak of the 2020 pandemic in June, which became a key reason for most officials to postpone rate hikes and observe market trends. The three dissenters at this meeting were Cleveland Fed President Beth Hammark, Minneapolis Fed President Neal Kashkari, and Dallas Fed President Lori Logan, representing the largest number of dissenting votes at a Fed meeting in nearly a decade. The three officials firmly advocated for a rate hike and issued a clear warning: if the Fed does not decisively tighten monetary policy and control price trends, persistently high inflation will become entrenched in the US economic system, forming an irreversible high-price situation. As a staunch supporter of rate hikes, Beth Hammark clearly stated that inflation has stubbornly exceeded targets for many years and cannot fall back to the established policy target on its own. It is noteworthy that all seven members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in Washington did not support the interest rate hike. According to the Fed's voting rules, only a split within the Board of Governors can result in a majority vote supporting a rate hike. Regarding the Fed's interest rate decision, opinions from Wall Street financial markets and the economics community are clearly divided. Most Wall Street economists approve of the rate hike, believing that the Fed urgently needs to tighten monetary policy to suppress high inflation, dispel market doubts about the central bank's adherence to the 2% inflation target, and consolidate the credibility of monetary policy. However, many economists oppose the move, focusing on the current pressure on the real economy. On the one hand, the US labor market exhibits significant structural fragility and insufficient job market stability; on the other hand, high mortgage rates coupled with persistently high housing prices continue to severely damage the US real estate market, not only dragging down industry recovery but also significantly increasing the burden of homeownership for ordinary people. Furthermore, the industry generally believes that this round of US inflation is not an endogenous problem but is mainly driven by sudden external shocks. The geopolitical conflict with Iran triggered a sharp rise in international oil prices, which, combined with the boosting effect of the Trump administration's tariff policies, has jointly pushed up price levels. In economics, such sudden and unpredictable external disturbances are considered short-term supply shocks. Mainstream economic theory holds that inflation caused by these factors is not long-term, and inflationary pressures will naturally ease once the external shocks subside. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve's interest rate hikes cannot fundamentally lower international oil prices and are insufficient to address the core cause of this round of inflation. This is the core reason why most Federal Reserve officials insist on a wait-and-see approach, awaiting a de-escalation of geopolitical tensions and a decline in oil prices. Dissident official Kashkari offered a crucial rebuttal to this mainstream wait-and-see approach, citing the historical lessons of high inflation in the United States in the 1970s. He warned the market that if short-term, sporadic price shocks accumulate, they will gradually solidify and eventually evolve into long-term, persistent high inflation. In the 1970s, Federal Reserve policymakers initially attributed inflation to external supply shocks as well, but ultimately proved that simply waiting for the market to heal itself was ineffective; only by implementing a strong tightening monetary policy could inflation be successfully suppressed and the macroeconomy stabilized. Despite repeated public statements from Federal Reserve Chairman Warsh promising that the Fed would adhere to its price stability goal and make every effort to overcome the inflation problem, the Fed continues its efforts to address this issue. He emphasized that his and the Federal Reserve's decisions were completely independent and would not be subject to external interference. Even if appointed by President Trump, and given Trump's consistent advocacy for interest rate cuts, the Fed would still take all necessary measures to curb inflation. However, this tough stance did not gain acceptance from Wall Street. Investors generally remained skeptical, questioning whether Warsh would implement interest rate hikes and fulfill his policy promises at this critical juncture of worsening inflation. Three dissenting officials proposed a more robust and forward-looking monetary policy approach. They argued that the current US economic fundamentals and labor market are resilient enough to withstand the impact of gradual, small interest rate hikes. The Fed should proactively begin phased interest rate increases to prevent the risk of inflation solidification. Kashkari explained that compared to passively waiting and allowing inflation to remain high, ultimately leading to a forced implementation of aggressive interest rate policies and a severe economic shock, gradual, small policy adjustments have significant advantages. If inflation continues to rise, gradual interest rate hikes can steadily suppress prices; if inflation gradually declines, the Fed can flexibly slow down or even pause the pace of interest rate hikes, minimizing the unnecessary negative impact of monetary policy on the real economy.