Iran has publicly declared that prohibiting US naval vessels from passing through the Strait of Hormuz will be a core clause in any agreement to reopen this crucial waterway. This threat is far from mere rhetoric; it represents Iran's attempt to exploit the current window of opportunity presented by the ceasefire negotiations to fundamentally undermine the US's more than half-century-long military dominance in the Persian Gulf. After months of devastating military attacks, the Iranian leadership has not backed down but has instead astutely seized this historic opportunity to squeeze the US military out of this vital energy chokepoint. This struggle for control of the strait is not only about the smooth flow of global energy resources but also about profoundly reshaping the military presence of major powers in the Middle East and the geopolitical landscape.

Rise of Hardliners: Bargaining Chips Elevated Under Revolutionary Guard Leadership

Iran's stringent demands reflect the growing influence of hardliners within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at the heart of Iranian power. The IRGC has long considered the expulsion of US troops its paramount goal for regional security, and now, through the Oman-mediated ceasefire negotiations, it is transforming militaryly unattainable demands into tools of political pressure. Iranian officials, in their negotiations with the Sultanate of Oman, made no secret of their bottom line: the strait will not be fully open unless the US accepts Iran's regulatory authority over passage. Although US mediators have clearly informed Oman that Washington will not recognize any form of passage restriction or toll arrangement, Iran seems in no hurry to compromise, instead viewing this disagreement as a test of US resolve and patience.

Military Realities and Political Gambles: Iran's Deceptive and Real Strategies

From a purely military perspective, several former senior commanders and security experts believe that if the US Navy is determined to force its way through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's current actual interception capability is quite limited. The Pentagon's successful deployment of two guided-missile destroyers through the waterway in April, at the height of the conflict, is clear evidence of this. However, this military weakness does not prevent Iran from adopting a high-pressure negotiation strategy of "retreating to advance." By demanding exorbitant amounts far exceeding its own capabilities, Tehran is essentially presenting US President Trump with a choice: restart the war or find a dignified way to withdraw, even if it means temporarily acquiescing to Iran's de facto intervention in the Strait. Jonathan Panikov, a former senior US intelligence official and researcher at the Atlantic Council, commented that regardless of the White House's decision, the final outcome is likely to be Iran gaining "significant de facto control" of the Strait—a judgment that reveals the ingenuity of Iran's strategic maneuvering: even if it cannot militarily defeat the US military, it can still construct a new regional order on a political and legal level.

The bottom line testing and room for concessions between the US and Iran

The US position, while seemingly firm, is implicitly flexible. A US official revealed that the Trump administration's bottom line for an acceptable arrangement regarding the Strait of Hormuz is that Iran cannot charge any passage fees, cannot refuse normal passage to any country's vessels, and any temporary adjustments to shipping routes must be short-term. In exchange, if Iran truly achieves unimpeded access, the US will lift its blockade of Iranian ports. Trump himself publicly acknowledged last Thursday that while the current US blockade makes the strait "relatively open," he also admitted that Iran is fully capable of creating chaos through asymmetric means such as laying mines, thereby deterring billion-dollar merchant ships. This statement demonstrates both a clear understanding of Iran's destructive capabilities and an indication that Washington is unwilling to take unlimited risks to maintain absolute right-of-way. The memorandum of understanding signed by the US and Iran in June paved the way for the opening of the strait and subsequent negotiations, but Iran's subsequent attacks on passing ships rendered the memorandum meaningless. Now, both sides need to find a new balance in a more complex atmosphere of mutual suspicion.

Draft details and Iran's expansion claims

According to informed officials, the current draft agreement for the Strait of Hormuz is quite cautious in its design: it plans to establish an inbound channel on the Iranian side and an outbound channel on the Omani side to achieve two-way traffic. However, the draft still needs the final signature of Iran's Supreme Leader to take effect. Once reached, it will undoubtedly unclog the transportation artery for about one-fifth of the world's oil trade and hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Qatari liquefied natural gas, injecting much-needed breathing space into the war-torn global economy. However, the Arab energy exporting countries along the Persian Gulf are caught in a dilemma: on the one hand, they are tired of the devastating impact of the six-month war on their economies; on the other hand, they are deeply worried that the agreement will give Iran permanent say in this economic lifeline, thus subjecting them to Tehran in the long term. More provocatively, Fars News Agency, which has close ties to the Revolutionary Guard, revealed that Iran's draft legislation also includes banning Israeli ships from passing through, banning ships or cargo related to actions against Iran's allies from transiting the Strait, and even requiring countries that have caused damage to Iran to pay compensation before being allowed passage, with the Iranian government and military giving full control over navigation. Although the mediators insisted that these extreme terms were not included in the draft Iran-Oman agreement, Iranian officials made no attempt to downplay these demands when conveying them to their Arab counterparts, demonstrating the Revolutionary Guard's firm resolve to end the freedom of passage regime in the Strait of Hormuz.

The erosion of the US military presence and profound changes in the regional landscape

The United States' long-standing naval presence in the Persian Gulf dates back to 1971, when it took over the British naval base in Bahrain and gradually developed it into the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet. In recent decades, the US has maintained as many as 30,000 troops at bases in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, continuously expanding its military footprint. However, this war has fundamentally altered this situation. Iran's attacks on US bases forced the Pentagon to redeploy troops to safer, less vulnerable facilities outside the Persian Gulf. This forced strategic retreat has objectively weakened the US's ability to rapidly project power. As Rosemary Kalanick, director of the Middle East program at the Defense Priorities Group, bluntly stated, "In terms of available military force, they have effectively driven us out of the Persian Gulf." Early in the war, Iran declared a "new era" of control over the Strait of Hormuz, regarding this control as a cornerstone of national security as important as its nuclear program and missile arsenal. It even established the "Persian Gulf Straits Authority," requiring ship owners to register and pay insurance premiums. Despite US sanctions against this agency, Iran's substantive regulatory actions have severely deterred commercial shipping.

The Dilemma and Long-Term Response of Gulf Countries

Faced with the Revolutionary Guard's willingness to escalate the situation and inflict heavy costs on Washington's regional allies, the Gulf states have had to confront a reality: while the proposed agreement implies long-term tacit acceptance of control over the Straits of Hormuz, it may be the least costly option at present. Regional officials admit that even without a perfect peace agreement, alternative routes—such as expanding alternative pipelines to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman, and increasing investment in overseas oil reserves—can hardly guarantee that the Revolutionary Guard will not launch long-range attacks on their energy infrastructure. Chris Long, a former British naval officer and head of intelligence at a shipping consultancy, predicts that even if an agreement is signed, energy transport through the Strait of Hormuz will remain "slow and low" for the next few years. In other words, through this "Straits gamble," even if Iran cannot completely expel the US military, it has successfully carved an undeniable mark on the power map of the Persian Gulf.

Summary: The Changing Landscape of Strait Control

In summary, Iran's use of ceasefire negotiations as leverage has escalated the power struggle over the Strait of Hormuz to a new level. This is driven by both the Revolutionary Guard's hardline stance and a precise calculation of the US's strategic patience. While the US remains firm in its rhetoric, its ability to maintain absolute dominance over the strait in the long term is facing a severe test, given its substantial military withdrawal. For the Gulf states, accepting limited Iranian control, while not ideal, is a pragmatic compromise to avoid greater conflict in the short term. Ultimately, the fate of the Strait of Hormuz concerns not only the rules of passage for a waterway but also reflects the profound transformation of the entire Middle East security architecture from unipolar hegemony to multipolar negotiation. The final outcome of this game is not yet determined, but it is certain that the era of US unilateral dominance in the Persian Gulf is quietly coming to an end. If the US and Iran reach an agreement and normal navigation resumes, concerns about supply disruptions will quickly subside, and oil prices will face downward pressure in the short term. However, with Iran gaining de facto regulatory power, long-term efficiency and compliance costs will increase. Coupled with the difficulty of bringing alternative pipelines in the Gulf into operation in the short term, the market will continue to factor in geopolitical risk premiums. Overall, oil prices are likely to exhibit a pattern of initial decline followed by fluctuations, with a low probability of significantly falling below pre-war levels.

Frequently Asked Questions

Question 1: Why did Iran choose this time to demand a ban on US warships passing through the Strait of Hormuz? Answer: Iran's move precisely seized the window of opportunity for ceasefire negotiations. After six months of intense conflict, although Iran suffered heavy military losses, the hardliners of the Revolutionary Guard believed that the negotiation phase was the best opportunity to transform the battlefield stalemate into political leverage. They attempted to exploit the urgent need of the US and Gulf states for unimpeded energy routes, using the reopening of the Strait as a bargaining chip to obtain institutional restrictions on the long-term US military presence. This was not a spur-of-the-moment decision, but rather a concentrated outburst of the Revolutionary Guard's decades-long strategic goal of "expelling US troops" at a specific historical juncture. Question 2: Will the US really accept Iran's regulatory rights over the Strait? Answer: Currently, the official US position clearly rejects any form of passage restriction or toll collection, but the flexibility in its actual attitude cannot be ignored. The US has put forward the bottom line of "non-confrontational passage," meaning that Iran must not refuse any ships or charge any fees, while temporary route arrangements are acceptable. The US has substantially withdrawn its military deployments, and the Trump administration faces the difficult choice of whether to restart the war. Therefore, the final agreement is likely to emerge in a vague manner—Iran will acquire some form of "coordination" or "management" role, rather than complete "control," but the specific arrangements for the passage of US warships may be negotiated separately through informal channels. Question 3: What impact will the agreement have on the global energy market? Answer: If the agreement is signed, it will greatly alleviate the paralysis of the Strait of Hormuz in the short term, restore the normal transportation of about one-fifth of the world's oil and a large amount of Qatari liquefied natural gas, effectively reduce the risk of energy price volatility, and provide respite for the world economy, which has been hit hard by war. However, this restoration will come at a cost—transportation will remain in a "low-speed, low-volume" state for a long time, shipping insurance premiums and compliance costs may rise, and any sudden friction could lead to the strait being closed again. At the same time, Gulf countries are also accelerating the construction of alternative pipelines and overseas reserves to hedge against potential future risks. Therefore, the "Hormuz premium" in the energy market will not completely disappear, but will only fall from an extremely high level to a new normal level. Question 4: How do the Gulf Arab countries view Iran's control demands? Answer: The Gulf countries are in a state of extreme contradiction. On the one hand, they rely on the Strait of Hormuz for energy exports, and the war has severely damaged their economies, making them eager for the reopening of the waterway. On the other hand, they are extremely concerned that if Iran gains permanent control, it will use the strait as a tool for political pressure, potentially severing their economic lifeline at any time. Privately, they acknowledge that the proposed agreement means accepting de facto Iranian control, considering it "the least bad option at present." Simultaneously, they are actively seeking alternative routes, but are well aware that no infrastructure alternative can completely circumvent the threat of long-range strikes from the Revolutionary Guard. Therefore, they can only offer diplomatic support for the agreement while continuing to rely on limited US protection for military and security. Question 5: Does the "Persian Gulf Straits Authority" established by Iran, requiring ship owners to register and pay fees, have legal validity? Answer: From an international law perspective, this agency lacks legitimacy because the Strait of Hormuz is an international navigation channel protected under international law frameworks such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. No single country has the right to unilaterally establish a management agency and impose fees. The United States has also imposed sanctions on this agency, threatening to punish shippers trading with it. However, in practice, Iran, leveraging its geographical advantages and military deterrence, has already established substantial influence in these waters. Commercial ship owners, lacking Iranian security guarantees, often dare not risk passage, allowing the agency to exert actual control "at the de facto level" rather than "at the legal level." Therefore, the core of the issue lies not in what international law stipulates, but in the ultimate contest between the US and Iran over land power and willingness to bear risk. At 09:09 Beijing time, Brent crude oil was trading at $84.54 per barrel.