The US's military pressure on Iran to negotiate its sovereignty red lines is a geopolitical gamble of who will blink first.
2026-02-04 16:38:04
So far, the negotiations have failed to reach an agreement, and the final outcome of these issues will not only affect the future of US-Iran relations, but also directly influence the volatility of global safe-haven assets, oil prices, and the US dollar index.
The turning point in this US-Iran conflict was the softening of US statements on Iran on January 29. Now, market attention is focused on the US-Iran negotiations scheduled for February 6 in Oman. What bargaining chips the US will ultimately gain will influence the final outcome of the geopolitical game.
US President Trump has repeatedly stated publicly that he prefers to reach an agreement through negotiations rather than take military action against Iran.
However, the outside world has never been able to figure out whether he really wants a substantive agreement that can be implemented, or just a superficial political show; and how much real concession Iran is willing to make is also shrouded in mystery over the negotiations.
The key information that has been disclosed so far is that the US and Iran have agreed to move the negotiations from Turkey to Oman on Friday, February 6.
U.S. Special Envoy Steve Vitkov and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi will meet as key representatives, with representatives from Saudi Arabia and Egypt also in attendance.
The positions of these two Middle Eastern countries will directly affect the market pricing of subsequent Middle East geopolitical risk premiums, becoming an important variable that cannot be ignored outside of negotiations.
From a market perspective, the more extreme Trump's demands are, the less likely Tehran is to compromise, and the higher the risk premium of geopolitical conflict will continue to push up gold and oil prices. Conversely, if Trump softens his stance, Iran's willingness to cooperate increases, war expectations cool down, the gains in safe-haven assets will inevitably be reversed, and the dollar index will be repriced accordingly. So, what exactly are Trump's core demands?
Last May, Trump threatened to have Iran "completely dismantle" its uranium enrichment facilities, but last week he changed his tune and only demanded that "enriched uranium not be weaponized."
The difference between these two demands is like the difference between "liquidating" and "reducing" positions in trading; their impact on the market is vastly different.
Since the Bush administration, every US president has made preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons a core objective, which has been a long-standing theme in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
If Trump only sets "not developing nuclear weapons" as the bottom line, Iran will most likely play the "delaying tactic": outwardly abandoning highly enriched uranium materials, but secretly retaining the core framework of its nuclear program, and restarting uranium enrichment activities after Trump leaves office.
This is like a "false breakout" in trading; it can soothe market sentiment in the short term, but the underlying risks in the long term are not eliminated.
But if Trump insists that Iran completely end all its nuclear programs, Tehran is unlikely to agree.
On the one hand, Iran has invested huge amounts of money, time and energy in its nuclear program, which is like a trader's heavily invested position that is not something that can be easily "cut off".
On the other hand, Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei regards the United States as his "number one adversary," and in his view, complete denuclearization is tantamount to "surrender" and the loss of deterrence capabilities.
Rather than signing such an agreement, he would rather take a gamble—betting that Trump, averse to a protracted war, would not dare to completely overthrow the Iranian regime.
The right to enrich uranium is not the only key variable influencing the course of negotiations; Iran’s missile arsenal and regional militia networks are also important factors influencing the geopolitical risk premium in the Middle East.
On January 29, the United States made specific demands and negotiated terms regarding Iran's missile program, explicitly requiring Iran to limit its missile range, cease developing high-precision guidance technology, and stop providing missile and drone technology to its "proxy network."
These statements are seen as a challenge to Iran's sovereignty, and the ongoing wave of protests within Iran continues to put pressure on the regime, indirectly affecting the pace of negotiations.
Initially, Trump threatened to bomb Iran if it did not stop its crackdown on protesters, which triggered a short-term surge in gold prices.
But now his attention has clearly shifted, which is not surprising—for the United States, human rights issues in Iran have never been the "core bargaining chip" in negotiations; national security interests are the fundamental factor determining the pricing of geopolitical risks.
More crucially, there is the issue of Iran's missiles, which is also the most feared topic by Israel and the Gulf Arab states. The difficulty of negotiating this issue far exceeds the right to enrich uranium, and it is almost an insurmountable red line.
For Iran, missiles are a "lifeline for stopping losses." Giving up missiles would be tantamount to exposing its own vulnerability to its opponents. Just as a trader would never easily give up their stop-loss point, it is almost impossible for Iran to make concessions on this issue.
Therefore, the room for negotiation on the missile issue is far smaller than that on the right to enrich uranium, and Khamenei and the Iranian military will inevitably stick to their bottom line. According to their consistent logic, rather than abandoning missiles in advance and causing Iran to lose its voice in the Middle East and fall into a passive and vulnerable position, it is better to use missiles in a possible conflict and fight to the death, at least to preserve a glimmer of hope for the regime's survival.
Compared to the uranium enrichment program and missile issues, Iran's regional proxies are the only issue with significant room for negotiation, and there may be a commitment to abandon weapons and economic support for some proxies.
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, Iraqi militias, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine are all important tools for Iran to project influence in the Middle East, but they are not the "lifeblood" of the regime's survival—which is the core difference between Iran and its missile and nuclear programs.
If Iran could relinquish (or feign relinquish) some regional proxies in exchange for the United States abandoning military action against it, it would likely consider such a "deal."
Moreover, Iran has extensive experience in smuggling weapons and funds to regional militias. For the United States to continuously monitor and strictly enforce the "abandon proxies" agreement is as difficult as monitoring off-exchange margin trading, which leaves room for maneuver for Iran.
Trump's deployment of a large number of troops in the Middle East is clearly intended to "force talks with force" and compel Iran to make more concessions at the negotiating table.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio bluntly stated that Iran is in its most vulnerable period since its founding in 1979, and for the United States, this is the best time to "lower prices," much like a trader decisively dumping shares when the counterparty faces liquidity shortages in an attempt to obtain more favorable trading terms.
But if Iran stands firm and refuses to compromise, the worst thing Trump could do is launch a symbolic, limited strike, or even abandon military action altogether, ultimately signing a vague agreement that is detrimental to the US, and then claiming a diplomatic victory.
This behavior will completely destroy the United States' international credibility, much like a trading platform default. No one will believe the US in its attempts to dominate Middle Eastern geopolitical rules in the future. Iran will become increasingly arrogant, and the Middle East geopolitical risk premium will be fully restored, triggering violent market fluctuations.
Currently, the United States is using a great deal of effort to exert maximum pressure. Whether it can make progress in negotiations on uranium enrichment and missiles is one aspect. However, if it cannot, whether the United States can achieve other results is another key focus of market attention. Returning empty-handed will weaken the United States' international credibility. At the same time, the United States may also choose to settle for second best through negotiations when it encounters strong resistance from Iran this time.
It is clear that the US’s claim to Iran’s right to enrich uranium, or the right to develop and use missiles in Iran, is tantamount to challenging Iran’s sovereignty. Therefore, the market is focused on whether the US will ultimately obtain these rights from Iran.
From both a geopolitical and market transactional perspective, considering Trump's demands, threats, and troop deployments, the United States can only accept one possible negotiation outcome:
They must either reach a mutually beneficial agreement through peaceful means or force Iran to comply through military force.
The core issue is that Iran's nuclear weapons development path must be verified and permanently terminated, its missile arsenal size must be limited, and its connections with regional proxies must be severed—otherwise, geopolitical risks in the Middle East will continue to loom over the global market, becoming a potential threat that could be triggered at any time.
It is worth noting that, regardless of the final form of this agreement, it will fail to meet the Iranian people's expectations for freedom and change.
But like most Middle Eastern countries except Israel, the United States prefers to maintain a weakened but not collapsed Iranian regime.
After all, the regional chaos caused by the collapse of the Iranian regime is like a "black swan" event in the market, which will cause huge fluctuations in the crude oil and foreign exchange markets. Neither the United States nor the Middle East can withstand such a risk shock.
The turning point in this US-Iran conflict was the softening of US statements on Iran on January 29. Now, market attention is focused on the US-Iran negotiations scheduled for February 6 in Oman. What bargaining chips the US will ultimately gain will influence the final outcome of the geopolitical game.
Negotiation Background: Dates Set, Multiple Parties Attending, Influencing Geopolitical Pricing
US President Trump has repeatedly stated publicly that he prefers to reach an agreement through negotiations rather than take military action against Iran.
However, the outside world has never been able to figure out whether he really wants a substantive agreement that can be implemented, or just a superficial political show; and how much real concession Iran is willing to make is also shrouded in mystery over the negotiations.
The key information that has been disclosed so far is that the US and Iran have agreed to move the negotiations from Turkey to Oman on Friday, February 6.
U.S. Special Envoy Steve Vitkov and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi will meet as key representatives, with representatives from Saudi Arabia and Egypt also in attendance.
The positions of these two Middle Eastern countries will directly affect the market pricing of subsequent Middle East geopolitical risk premiums, becoming an important variable that cannot be ignored outside of negotiations.
From a market perspective, the more extreme Trump's demands are, the less likely Tehran is to compromise, and the higher the risk premium of geopolitical conflict will continue to push up gold and oil prices. Conversely, if Trump softens his stance, Iran's willingness to cooperate increases, war expectations cool down, the gains in safe-haven assets will inevitably be reversed, and the dollar index will be repriced accordingly. So, what exactly are Trump's core demands?
The United States: Softening of its demands from "complete dismantling" to banning the weaponization of enriched uranium.
Last May, Trump threatened to have Iran "completely dismantle" its uranium enrichment facilities, but last week he changed his tune and only demanded that "enriched uranium not be weaponized."
The difference between these two demands is like the difference between "liquidating" and "reducing" positions in trading; their impact on the market is vastly different.
Since the Bush administration, every US president has made preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons a core objective, which has been a long-standing theme in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
If Trump only sets "not developing nuclear weapons" as the bottom line, Iran will most likely play the "delaying tactic": outwardly abandoning highly enriched uranium materials, but secretly retaining the core framework of its nuclear program, and restarting uranium enrichment activities after Trump leaves office.
This is like a "false breakout" in trading; it can soothe market sentiment in the short term, but the underlying risks in the long term are not eliminated.
Iran: We will never accept "disarmament-style" denuclearization.
But if Trump insists that Iran completely end all its nuclear programs, Tehran is unlikely to agree.
On the one hand, Iran has invested huge amounts of money, time and energy in its nuclear program, which is like a trader's heavily invested position that is not something that can be easily "cut off".
On the other hand, Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei regards the United States as his "number one adversary," and in his view, complete denuclearization is tantamount to "surrender" and the loss of deterrence capabilities.
Rather than signing such an agreement, he would rather take a gamble—betting that Trump, averse to a protracted war, would not dare to completely overthrow the Iranian regime.
Missile Depots and Protests: Human Rights Marginalized, Missiles as a "Lifeline"
The right to enrich uranium is not the only key variable influencing the course of negotiations; Iran’s missile arsenal and regional militia networks are also important factors influencing the geopolitical risk premium in the Middle East.
On January 29, the United States made specific demands and negotiated terms regarding Iran's missile program, explicitly requiring Iran to limit its missile range, cease developing high-precision guidance technology, and stop providing missile and drone technology to its "proxy network."
These statements are seen as a challenge to Iran's sovereignty, and the ongoing wave of protests within Iran continues to put pressure on the regime, indirectly affecting the pace of negotiations.
Initially, Trump threatened to bomb Iran if it did not stop its crackdown on protesters, which triggered a short-term surge in gold prices.
But now his attention has clearly shifted, which is not surprising—for the United States, human rights issues in Iran have never been the "core bargaining chip" in negotiations; national security interests are the fundamental factor determining the pricing of geopolitical risks.
More crucially, there is the issue of Iran's missiles, which is also the most feared topic by Israel and the Gulf Arab states. The difficulty of negotiating this issue far exceeds the right to enrich uranium, and it is almost an insurmountable red line.
For Iran, missiles are a "lifeline for stopping losses." Giving up missiles would be tantamount to exposing its own vulnerability to its opponents. Just as a trader would never easily give up their stop-loss point, it is almost impossible for Iran to make concessions on this issue.
Therefore, the room for negotiation on the missile issue is far smaller than that on the right to enrich uranium, and Khamenei and the Iranian military will inevitably stick to their bottom line. According to their consistent logic, rather than abandoning missiles in advance and causing Iran to lose its voice in the Middle East and fall into a passive and vulnerable position, it is better to use missiles in a possible conflict and fight to the death, at least to preserve a glimmer of hope for the regime's survival.
Regional Agent: The Only "Tradeable Bargain" in Negotiations
Compared to the uranium enrichment program and missile issues, Iran's regional proxies are the only issue with significant room for negotiation, and there may be a commitment to abandon weapons and economic support for some proxies.
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, Iraqi militias, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine are all important tools for Iran to project influence in the Middle East, but they are not the "lifeblood" of the regime's survival—which is the core difference between Iran and its missile and nuclear programs.
If Iran could relinquish (or feign relinquish) some regional proxies in exchange for the United States abandoning military action against it, it would likely consider such a "deal."
Moreover, Iran has extensive experience in smuggling weapons and funds to regional militias. For the United States to continuously monitor and strictly enforce the "abandon proxies" agreement is as difficult as monitoring off-exchange margin trading, which leaves room for maneuver for Iran.
To compromise or not? The US's "forceful negotiations" and potential risks
Trump's deployment of a large number of troops in the Middle East is clearly intended to "force talks with force" and compel Iran to make more concessions at the negotiating table.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio bluntly stated that Iran is in its most vulnerable period since its founding in 1979, and for the United States, this is the best time to "lower prices," much like a trader decisively dumping shares when the counterparty faces liquidity shortages in an attempt to obtain more favorable trading terms.
But if Iran stands firm and refuses to compromise, the worst thing Trump could do is launch a symbolic, limited strike, or even abandon military action altogether, ultimately signing a vague agreement that is detrimental to the US, and then claiming a diplomatic victory.
This behavior will completely destroy the United States' international credibility, much like a trading platform default. No one will believe the US in its attempts to dominate Middle Eastern geopolitical rules in the future. Iran will become increasingly arrogant, and the Middle East geopolitical risk premium will be fully restored, triggering violent market fluctuations.
Ultimate Game Theory: The US Wants to "Weaken, Not Overthrow" the Iranian Regime
Currently, the United States is using a great deal of effort to exert maximum pressure. Whether it can make progress in negotiations on uranium enrichment and missiles is one aspect. However, if it cannot, whether the United States can achieve other results is another key focus of market attention. Returning empty-handed will weaken the United States' international credibility. At the same time, the United States may also choose to settle for second best through negotiations when it encounters strong resistance from Iran this time.
It is clear that the US’s claim to Iran’s right to enrich uranium, or the right to develop and use missiles in Iran, is tantamount to challenging Iran’s sovereignty. Therefore, the market is focused on whether the US will ultimately obtain these rights from Iran.
From both a geopolitical and market transactional perspective, considering Trump's demands, threats, and troop deployments, the United States can only accept one possible negotiation outcome:
They must either reach a mutually beneficial agreement through peaceful means or force Iran to comply through military force.
The core issue is that Iran's nuclear weapons development path must be verified and permanently terminated, its missile arsenal size must be limited, and its connections with regional proxies must be severed—otherwise, geopolitical risks in the Middle East will continue to loom over the global market, becoming a potential threat that could be triggered at any time.
It is worth noting that, regardless of the final form of this agreement, it will fail to meet the Iranian people's expectations for freedom and change.
But like most Middle Eastern countries except Israel, the United States prefers to maintain a weakened but not collapsed Iranian regime.
After all, the regional chaos caused by the collapse of the Iranian regime is like a "black swan" event in the market, which will cause huge fluctuations in the crude oil and foreign exchange markets. Neither the United States nor the Middle East can withstand such a risk shock.
- Risk Warning and Disclaimer
- The market involves risk, and trading may not be suitable for all investors. This article is for reference only and does not constitute personal investment advice, nor does it take into account certain users’ specific investment objectives, financial situation, or other needs. Any investment decisions made based on this information are at your own risk.
