From Lehman Brothers' collapse to the sell-off of software bonds: The origins, development, and solutions to the US credit crisis.
2026-04-13 16:10:00
As the core engine of the global financial system, the US credit market has been walking a tightrope between "breaking boundaries" and "running out of control" for more than half a century.
From the groundbreaking concept of high-yield bonds to the mass-market frenzy of direct lending, every financial innovation has been accompanied by a frenzied pursuit of capital, but it has also sown the seeds of cyclical bubbles.
The aftershocks of the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis have not yet subsided, and the software debt shock triggered by the AI technology in the 2020s has followed, confirming the assertion of Howard Marks, founder of Oaktree Capital: "The risks in the U.S. credit market stem more from the irrational behavior of investors than from the assets themselves."
Looking back at history, the evolution of credit in the United States is essentially a cycle of "innovation-bubble-bursting-restructuring," and the greed and optimism in human nature, as well as the dramatic fluctuations in the interest rate environment, have always been the core variables driving this cycle.
Every major breakthrough in the US credit market started with "solving financing pain points," but ultimately fell into a risk vortex due to overexpansion, forming a clear mark of the times.
1970s: The Breakthrough of High-Yield Bonds, a Double-Edged Sword of Risk Pricing
Before the 1970s, non-investment grade companies (credit ratings below BBB) in the United States were almost excluded from the public bond market, and speculative-grade debt was limited to bonds that were originally investment grade but were downgraded.
Michael Milken’s “risk-return matching” concept completely overturned this pattern—he argued that non-investment grade companies are also justifiable for financing as long as the coupon rate is sufficient to cover the default risk.
This innovation directly spurred the development of the U.S. high-yield bond market, which now stands at $1.5 trillion and has become an important financing channel for small and medium-sized enterprises.
However, the hidden dangers sown at that time have already become apparent: investors' blind pursuit of "high returns" laid the groundwork for the subsequent loss of control over leverage ratios.
1980s: The Leveraged Buyout Frenzy, the Rise and Concerns of Private Equity
The widespread adoption of high-yield bonds has provided "ammunition" for leveraged buyouts (LBOs), enabling small companies and buyout funds to acquire large corporations far exceeding their own size through high leverage financing.
This trend drove the scale of leveraged buyout transactions to grow exponentially, eventually transforming into the "private equity" industry in the 1990s and ushering in an era of institutional capital-led mergers and acquisitions.
However, the vulnerability of the high-leverage model is obvious: the corporate debt burden increases sharply, and once cash flow deteriorates, it may fall into a default crisis, laying hidden dangers for subsequent market adjustments.
1990s: The expansion of securitization and the risk traps of structured innovation
In the 1990s, the US credit market ushered in a wave of structural innovation: broad syndicated loans broke the limitations of interbank distribution and were allocated to institutional investors on a large scale, pushing the leveraged loan market to $1.5 trillion, on par with the high-yield bond market;
Layered securitization technology has expanded from mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to various types of debt assets, meeting the needs of different investors by dividing risk levels.
However, this "risk diversification" design actually masked the flaws in asset quality, laying the groundwork for the subprime mortgage crisis in the early 21st century—banks used complex structures to package subprime loans as AAA-rated securities, deceiving global investors.
The 2000s: The bursting of the subprime mortgage bubble and the American roots of the global financial crisis.
After the Nasdaq bubble burst in 2000, American investors turned to "alternative investments" such as hedge funds and private equity, which further boosted the private equity industry.
However, at the same time, the rampant expansion of the US subprime mortgage market was brewing a catastrophe: banks launched "fraudulent loans" with "zero down payment and no proof of income," packaged them into housing mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), and pushed them to the market through false ratings.
In 2007, the subprime mortgage default rate soared, the RMBS rating collapsed, and ultimately triggered the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. US housing prices plummeted (with some cities experiencing drops of 60%-70%), Lehman Brothers collapsed, and unemployment soared, becoming the most painful lesson in US credit history.
2010s: Private lending fills the gap, market restructuring under tightened regulation
Following the financial crisis, U.S. banks faced multiple constraints, including higher capital adequacy ratios and tighter regulations, leading to a sharp decline in their willingness to lend and a funding gap in the private equity sector.
Investment management firms seized the opportunity to fill the gap, and the "private lending" business rapidly emerged, with direct lending becoming the core—focusing on providing customized loans to mid-sized non-investment grade companies backed by private equity. With its flexible terms and efficient approval process, it quickly became the mainstay of the private lending market.
While this innovation solved the market financing gap, it also created a deep link between private credit and private equity, laying the groundwork for future risk transmission.
The 2020s: Mass Celebration and the Impact of AI, a New Crisis Approaching
In the 2020s, the U.S. direct lending market began a "massification" transformation, with investment instruments opening up to individual investors and retirement accounts. The influx of massive capital drove a rapid expansion of assets under management (AUM).
Excess capital has led to vicious competition: lenders have lowered their yield requirements, weakened risk clauses, and relaxed due diligence, creating hidden dangers for potential risks to emerge.
To make matters worse, the disruptive impact of AI technology has shattered the debt logic of the software industry—Anthropic's programming model and automation plugins have significantly reduced the need for manual programming, leading to a concentrated sell-off of software-related loans, which account for 20%-30% of the direct lending market. This concentrated sell-off caused by deleveraging is also one of the main reasons why the market value of some software companies, led by Adobe, has been halved in a short period of time.
Even more serious is that Bank of America has begun to raise borrowing costs for private credit funds, further squeezing fund profit margins and exacerbating market liquidity pressures.
Looking at the evolution of the US credit market, every innovation follows a similar bubble cycle, and human greed, optimism, and herd mentality are the core driving forces behind this cycle.
1. Starting point: Early popularity triggered by novelty
Any new financing tool, when it first emerges in the US, possesses a natural appeal because it is "untested by the market." This is true for high-yield bonds, securitized products, and direct loans—advocates can freely tout their advantages without facing scrutiny of historical risk data; and investors' desire for excess returns makes them easily swayed by the "innovation story." The "profit-making effect" of early investors entering the market at low cost triggers a flood of subsequent capital, pushing the initial formation of a bubble.
2. Evolution: The divergence between capital inflow and standard relaxation
A frenzy of capital inevitably lowers the risk threshold. The US high-yield bond market saw chaos, with companies' creditworthiness being ignored and yields blindly pursued; the subprime mortgage market gave rise to extreme products requiring zero down payment and no proof of income; and the direct lending market in the 2020s witnessed competition that relaxed collateral requirements and tolerated higher leverage. As Howard Marks said, "The most dangerous thing in the world is when people generally believe there is no risk." When the market confuses "possibility" with "certainty," risk is already accumulating in the shadows.
3. Rupture: A chain reaction triggered by external impact.
The bursting of US credit bubbles is often triggered by external factors: in 2008, it was the surge in subprime mortgage default rates; in the 2020s, it was the impact of AI technology and rising interest rates. Once market sentiment shifts from extreme optimism to pessimism, panic selling and concentrated redemptions occur. The problem of "mismatch between illiquid assets and short-term redemptions" is particularly prominent in the direct lending market—funds cannot quickly liquidate underlying loan assets and can only restrict redemptions, further exacerbating market panic and creating a vicious cycle of "redemption wave - liquidity depletion - valuation collapse."
4. Evidence: The repeated repetition of historical lessons
From the 1929 U.S. stock market crash (90% margin leverage, maturity mismatch) to the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis (false securitization, regulatory gaps), and now to the turmoil in the direct lending market, history has repeatedly proven that excessive behavior in the U.S. credit market stems from human weaknesses. Even with continuous improvements in the regulatory system and ongoing investor education, bubbles will still emerge in different forms—the only thing that changes is the financing tools, and the unchanging cycle of "greed-euphoria-collapse."
Currently, the US direct lending market is facing multiple overlapping crises, and the deep integration of private credit and private equity further amplifies the risk transmission effect.
1. Software debt risk: AI disrupts industry logic
Over the past decade, U.S. private equity funds have made numerous acquisitions of software companies, and direct lending institutions have provided massive financing, simply because software companies are seen as high-quality targets with "stable cash flow and high moats."
However, technological breakthroughs by AI companies such as Anthropic have completely changed the industry landscape—the demand for human programming has plummeted, the business models of software companies have been impacted, and investors' concerns about software debt have triggered a concentrated sell-off.
It is worth noting that the current pressure is more driven by sentiment: an internal memo from Oaktree Capital shows that most software companies are still operating steadily, but investors' "one-size-fits-all" sell-off has exacerbated market volatility.
2. Liquidity mismatch: Non-current assets face concentrated redemptions
There is an inherent contradiction between the "inliquidity" of direct loans and the "redemption commitment" of funds.
When software debt triggers a wave of redemptions, fund managers are unable to liquidate assets in a timely manner and can only suspend payments or restrict redemptions, which in turn raises questions among investors about the accuracy of asset valuations and creates wider panic.
This predicament mirrors the 2008 crisis in which money market funds "fell below net asset value," exposing structural liquidity deficiencies in the US credit market.
3. Rising interest rates: Disrupting the symbiotic cycle between private credit and equity.
Over the past four decades, the U.S. private equity industry has benefited from a long-term decline in interest rates—bank loan rates fell from 22.25% in 1980 to 2.25% in 2020, with low-cost leverage driving a virtuous cycle of "financing-acquisition-value-exit".
However, since 2022, the Federal Reserve has raised interest rates to curb inflation, with the federal funds rate soaring to 5.25%-5.5%, which has directly led to a significant increase in interest expenses, a decline in profits, and lower exit prices for companies under private equity.
MSCI data shows that from 2022 to the third quarter of 2025, the annualized return of US private equity funds was only 5.8%, far lower than the S&P 500's 11.6%.
The plight of private equity has a direct impact on the direct lending market: reduced acquisition activity has led to a decrease in loan demand, and increased corporate debt repayment pressure has pushed up the risk of default.
In the face of the cyclical predicament in the US credit market, the practices of institutions such as Oaktree Capital have provided valuable insights—only by respecting the cycle, adhering to risk control, and balancing optimism and skepticism can one navigate through the cycle of risk.
1. Core of Risk Control: Moderate Restraint and Boundary Control
Oaktree Capital, a benchmark in the US credit industry, has always adhered to the principle of "not chasing short-term trends".
During the frenzy in the direct lending market, Oaktree Capital, judging that "returns were low and terms were weak," kept its direct lending scale below 15% of total assets under management, with software-related loan exposure far below the industry average.
This restraint of "doing what should be done and not doing what should not be done" has enabled it to take the initiative in the current turmoil, proving the idea that "the best risk control is making good investment decisions."
2. Foundational Mindset: Respect for Cycles and Lessons from History
The current adjustment in the direct lending market bears a striking resemblance to the turmoil in the high-yield bond market at the end of the 1980s—both instances stemming from the excessive expansion of new instruments followed by external shocks. Historical experience suggests that such adjustments do not signify the end of an industry, but rather an inevitable return to market rationality.
As Bob O'Leary of Oaktree Capital stated, the high-yield bond market has returned to stability after the cycle has been broken, and the direct lending market will also eliminate inferior institutions, optimize its structure, and achieve healthier development.
For the US market, it is crucial to remember the lessons of the subprime crisis and avoid repeating the mistakes of "relaxing regulation and condoning leverage".
3. Long-term logic: An investment philosophy that balances optimism and skepticism
In the wave of innovation in the US credit market, optimism is the driving force, but blind optimism can lead to uncontrolled risks; skepticism is a barrier, but excessive skepticism can cause missed opportunities.
Successful investors need to find a balance between the two: being open to innovation while remaining wary of frenzy; believing in the long-term value of quality assets while not ignoring short-term risks.
Oaktree Capital's experience has shown that by forgoing the temptation of "short-term expansion" and adhering to "high-standard due diligence and conservative structure," one may miss out on short-term gains, but can maintain stability throughout economic cycles.
The century-long evolution of the US credit market has always revolved around the interplay between "innovation and risk".
From high-yield bonds to direct loans, from subprime mortgages to software debt, the rise of each new financing instrument is accompanied by new forms of risk, but the core logic of "bubble cycle patterns, human-driven behavior, and risk control as the foundation for survival" has never changed.
Currently, the impact of AI technology and rising interest rates have exacerbated market volatility, but this also presents an opportunity for the market to self-purify.
For the US credit market, only by remembering historical lessons, adhering to the bottom line of risk control, and maintaining rationality and restraint can it stand firm in the vortex of debt risk and achieve long-term success in navigating economic cycles.
After all, the ultimate goal of financial innovation is to serve the real economy, not to be a game of capital revelry—this is precisely the wisdom that the US credit market should learn from its cycles.
From the groundbreaking concept of high-yield bonds to the mass-market frenzy of direct lending, every financial innovation has been accompanied by a frenzied pursuit of capital, but it has also sown the seeds of cyclical bubbles.
The aftershocks of the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis have not yet subsided, and the software debt shock triggered by the AI technology in the 2020s has followed, confirming the assertion of Howard Marks, founder of Oaktree Capital: "The risks in the U.S. credit market stem more from the irrational behavior of investors than from the assets themselves."
Looking back at history, the evolution of credit in the United States is essentially a cycle of "innovation-bubble-bursting-restructuring," and the greed and optimism in human nature, as well as the dramatic fluctuations in the interest rate environment, have always been the core variables driving this cycle.
Sixty Years of Evolution in the US Credit Market: Risks Hidden Behind Innovation
Every major breakthrough in the US credit market started with "solving financing pain points," but ultimately fell into a risk vortex due to overexpansion, forming a clear mark of the times.
1970s: The Breakthrough of High-Yield Bonds, a Double-Edged Sword of Risk Pricing
Before the 1970s, non-investment grade companies (credit ratings below BBB) in the United States were almost excluded from the public bond market, and speculative-grade debt was limited to bonds that were originally investment grade but were downgraded.
Michael Milken’s “risk-return matching” concept completely overturned this pattern—he argued that non-investment grade companies are also justifiable for financing as long as the coupon rate is sufficient to cover the default risk.
This innovation directly spurred the development of the U.S. high-yield bond market, which now stands at $1.5 trillion and has become an important financing channel for small and medium-sized enterprises.
However, the hidden dangers sown at that time have already become apparent: investors' blind pursuit of "high returns" laid the groundwork for the subsequent loss of control over leverage ratios.
1980s: The Leveraged Buyout Frenzy, the Rise and Concerns of Private Equity
The widespread adoption of high-yield bonds has provided "ammunition" for leveraged buyouts (LBOs), enabling small companies and buyout funds to acquire large corporations far exceeding their own size through high leverage financing.
This trend drove the scale of leveraged buyout transactions to grow exponentially, eventually transforming into the "private equity" industry in the 1990s and ushering in an era of institutional capital-led mergers and acquisitions.
However, the vulnerability of the high-leverage model is obvious: the corporate debt burden increases sharply, and once cash flow deteriorates, it may fall into a default crisis, laying hidden dangers for subsequent market adjustments.
1990s: The expansion of securitization and the risk traps of structured innovation
In the 1990s, the US credit market ushered in a wave of structural innovation: broad syndicated loans broke the limitations of interbank distribution and were allocated to institutional investors on a large scale, pushing the leveraged loan market to $1.5 trillion, on par with the high-yield bond market;
Layered securitization technology has expanded from mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to various types of debt assets, meeting the needs of different investors by dividing risk levels.
However, this "risk diversification" design actually masked the flaws in asset quality, laying the groundwork for the subprime mortgage crisis in the early 21st century—banks used complex structures to package subprime loans as AAA-rated securities, deceiving global investors.
The 2000s: The bursting of the subprime mortgage bubble and the American roots of the global financial crisis.
After the Nasdaq bubble burst in 2000, American investors turned to "alternative investments" such as hedge funds and private equity, which further boosted the private equity industry.
However, at the same time, the rampant expansion of the US subprime mortgage market was brewing a catastrophe: banks launched "fraudulent loans" with "zero down payment and no proof of income," packaged them into housing mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), and pushed them to the market through false ratings.
In 2007, the subprime mortgage default rate soared, the RMBS rating collapsed, and ultimately triggered the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. US housing prices plummeted (with some cities experiencing drops of 60%-70%), Lehman Brothers collapsed, and unemployment soared, becoming the most painful lesson in US credit history.
2010s: Private lending fills the gap, market restructuring under tightened regulation
Following the financial crisis, U.S. banks faced multiple constraints, including higher capital adequacy ratios and tighter regulations, leading to a sharp decline in their willingness to lend and a funding gap in the private equity sector.
Investment management firms seized the opportunity to fill the gap, and the "private lending" business rapidly emerged, with direct lending becoming the core—focusing on providing customized loans to mid-sized non-investment grade companies backed by private equity. With its flexible terms and efficient approval process, it quickly became the mainstay of the private lending market.
While this innovation solved the market financing gap, it also created a deep link between private credit and private equity, laying the groundwork for future risk transmission.
The 2020s: Mass Celebration and the Impact of AI, a New Crisis Approaching
In the 2020s, the U.S. direct lending market began a "massification" transformation, with investment instruments opening up to individual investors and retirement accounts. The influx of massive capital drove a rapid expansion of assets under management (AUM).
Excess capital has led to vicious competition: lenders have lowered their yield requirements, weakened risk clauses, and relaxed due diligence, creating hidden dangers for potential risks to emerge.
To make matters worse, the disruptive impact of AI technology has shattered the debt logic of the software industry—Anthropic's programming model and automation plugins have significantly reduced the need for manual programming, leading to a concentrated sell-off of software-related loans, which account for 20%-30% of the direct lending market. This concentrated sell-off caused by deleveraging is also one of the main reasons why the market value of some software companies, led by Adobe, has been halved in a short period of time.
Even more serious is that Bank of America has begun to raise borrowing costs for private credit funds, further squeezing fund profit margins and exacerbating market liquidity pressures.
The cyclical iron law of US credit bubbles: human-driven prosperity and collapse.
Looking at the evolution of the US credit market, every innovation follows a similar bubble cycle, and human greed, optimism, and herd mentality are the core driving forces behind this cycle.
1. Starting point: Early popularity triggered by novelty
Any new financing tool, when it first emerges in the US, possesses a natural appeal because it is "untested by the market." This is true for high-yield bonds, securitized products, and direct loans—advocates can freely tout their advantages without facing scrutiny of historical risk data; and investors' desire for excess returns makes them easily swayed by the "innovation story." The "profit-making effect" of early investors entering the market at low cost triggers a flood of subsequent capital, pushing the initial formation of a bubble.
2. Evolution: The divergence between capital inflow and standard relaxation
A frenzy of capital inevitably lowers the risk threshold. The US high-yield bond market saw chaos, with companies' creditworthiness being ignored and yields blindly pursued; the subprime mortgage market gave rise to extreme products requiring zero down payment and no proof of income; and the direct lending market in the 2020s witnessed competition that relaxed collateral requirements and tolerated higher leverage. As Howard Marks said, "The most dangerous thing in the world is when people generally believe there is no risk." When the market confuses "possibility" with "certainty," risk is already accumulating in the shadows.
3. Rupture: A chain reaction triggered by external impact.
The bursting of US credit bubbles is often triggered by external factors: in 2008, it was the surge in subprime mortgage default rates; in the 2020s, it was the impact of AI technology and rising interest rates. Once market sentiment shifts from extreme optimism to pessimism, panic selling and concentrated redemptions occur. The problem of "mismatch between illiquid assets and short-term redemptions" is particularly prominent in the direct lending market—funds cannot quickly liquidate underlying loan assets and can only restrict redemptions, further exacerbating market panic and creating a vicious cycle of "redemption wave - liquidity depletion - valuation collapse."
4. Evidence: The repeated repetition of historical lessons
From the 1929 U.S. stock market crash (90% margin leverage, maturity mismatch) to the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis (false securitization, regulatory gaps), and now to the turmoil in the direct lending market, history has repeatedly proven that excessive behavior in the U.S. credit market stems from human weaknesses. Even with continuous improvements in the regulatory system and ongoing investor education, bubbles will still emerge in different forms—the only thing that changes is the financing tools, and the unchanging cycle of "greed-euphoria-collapse."
Current Dilemma: The Impact of AI, Rising Interest Rates, and a Liquidity Crisis
Currently, the US direct lending market is facing multiple overlapping crises, and the deep integration of private credit and private equity further amplifies the risk transmission effect.
1. Software debt risk: AI disrupts industry logic
Over the past decade, U.S. private equity funds have made numerous acquisitions of software companies, and direct lending institutions have provided massive financing, simply because software companies are seen as high-quality targets with "stable cash flow and high moats."
However, technological breakthroughs by AI companies such as Anthropic have completely changed the industry landscape—the demand for human programming has plummeted, the business models of software companies have been impacted, and investors' concerns about software debt have triggered a concentrated sell-off.
It is worth noting that the current pressure is more driven by sentiment: an internal memo from Oaktree Capital shows that most software companies are still operating steadily, but investors' "one-size-fits-all" sell-off has exacerbated market volatility.
2. Liquidity mismatch: Non-current assets face concentrated redemptions
There is an inherent contradiction between the "inliquidity" of direct loans and the "redemption commitment" of funds.
When software debt triggers a wave of redemptions, fund managers are unable to liquidate assets in a timely manner and can only suspend payments or restrict redemptions, which in turn raises questions among investors about the accuracy of asset valuations and creates wider panic.
This predicament mirrors the 2008 crisis in which money market funds "fell below net asset value," exposing structural liquidity deficiencies in the US credit market.
3. Rising interest rates: Disrupting the symbiotic cycle between private credit and equity.
Over the past four decades, the U.S. private equity industry has benefited from a long-term decline in interest rates—bank loan rates fell from 22.25% in 1980 to 2.25% in 2020, with low-cost leverage driving a virtuous cycle of "financing-acquisition-value-exit".
However, since 2022, the Federal Reserve has raised interest rates to curb inflation, with the federal funds rate soaring to 5.25%-5.5%, which has directly led to a significant increase in interest expenses, a decline in profits, and lower exit prices for companies under private equity.
MSCI data shows that from 2022 to the third quarter of 2025, the annualized return of US private equity funds was only 5.8%, far lower than the S&P 500's 11.6%.
The plight of private equity has a direct impact on the direct lending market: reduced acquisition activity has led to a decrease in loan demand, and increased corporate debt repayment pressure has pushed up the risk of default.
Breaking the deadlock: Historical lessons and risk control wisdom
In the face of the cyclical predicament in the US credit market, the practices of institutions such as Oaktree Capital have provided valuable insights—only by respecting the cycle, adhering to risk control, and balancing optimism and skepticism can one navigate through the cycle of risk.
1. Core of Risk Control: Moderate Restraint and Boundary Control
Oaktree Capital, a benchmark in the US credit industry, has always adhered to the principle of "not chasing short-term trends".
During the frenzy in the direct lending market, Oaktree Capital, judging that "returns were low and terms were weak," kept its direct lending scale below 15% of total assets under management, with software-related loan exposure far below the industry average.
This restraint of "doing what should be done and not doing what should not be done" has enabled it to take the initiative in the current turmoil, proving the idea that "the best risk control is making good investment decisions."
2. Foundational Mindset: Respect for Cycles and Lessons from History
The current adjustment in the direct lending market bears a striking resemblance to the turmoil in the high-yield bond market at the end of the 1980s—both instances stemming from the excessive expansion of new instruments followed by external shocks. Historical experience suggests that such adjustments do not signify the end of an industry, but rather an inevitable return to market rationality.
As Bob O'Leary of Oaktree Capital stated, the high-yield bond market has returned to stability after the cycle has been broken, and the direct lending market will also eliminate inferior institutions, optimize its structure, and achieve healthier development.
For the US market, it is crucial to remember the lessons of the subprime crisis and avoid repeating the mistakes of "relaxing regulation and condoning leverage".
3. Long-term logic: An investment philosophy that balances optimism and skepticism
In the wave of innovation in the US credit market, optimism is the driving force, but blind optimism can lead to uncontrolled risks; skepticism is a barrier, but excessive skepticism can cause missed opportunities.
Successful investors need to find a balance between the two: being open to innovation while remaining wary of frenzy; believing in the long-term value of quality assets while not ignoring short-term risks.
Oaktree Capital's experience has shown that by forgoing the temptation of "short-term expansion" and adhering to "high-standard due diligence and conservative structure," one may miss out on short-term gains, but can maintain stability throughout economic cycles.
Conclusion: Finding a long-term solution within the cycle of risk
The century-long evolution of the US credit market has always revolved around the interplay between "innovation and risk".
From high-yield bonds to direct loans, from subprime mortgages to software debt, the rise of each new financing instrument is accompanied by new forms of risk, but the core logic of "bubble cycle patterns, human-driven behavior, and risk control as the foundation for survival" has never changed.
Currently, the impact of AI technology and rising interest rates have exacerbated market volatility, but this also presents an opportunity for the market to self-purify.
For the US credit market, only by remembering historical lessons, adhering to the bottom line of risk control, and maintaining rationality and restraint can it stand firm in the vortex of debt risk and achieve long-term success in navigating economic cycles.
After all, the ultimate goal of financial innovation is to serve the real economy, not to be a game of capital revelry—this is precisely the wisdom that the US credit market should learn from its cycles.
- Risk Warning and Disclaimer
- The market involves risk, and trading may not be suitable for all investors. This article is for reference only and does not constitute personal investment advice, nor does it take into account certain users’ specific investment objectives, financial situation, or other needs. Any investment decisions made based on this information are at your own risk.
