On Monday (July 20), international oil prices fell in early European trading, and hopes for peace talks seemed to have been rekindled. Iranian Foreign Minister Araqchi stated today that Iran is willing to negotiate on the premise of safeguarding its national interests. While accepting talks, Iran maintains a firm stance. Araqchi also stated that there is no room for negotiation on the Strait of Hormuz issue, and that managing and restoring navigation through the strait is entirely Iran's responsibility. He also revealed that the US attempted to "buy" Iran last June, which he rejected on the spot—Iran's uranium was obtained at the cost of many scientists' lives. In other words, Iran has no intention of backing down on either the Strait of Hormuz issue or uranium enrichment. The reason for this statement is unclear: has Iran already achieved its previously set goals, or has the continuous US bombing forcing Iran to adjust its strategy? Both explanations have their supporting points: if the former, the signal for talks is a gesture of composure under a victory; if the latter, it is a tactical retreat after being hurt. US media reports reveal another layer of opacity—according to independent tracking agencies such as IranWarLive, the Pentagon officially confirmed 13 deaths, while independent statistics give figures of 15 to 17, a significant discrepancy. The US statement that it would seek retribution for its fallen soldiers mirrors Iran's logic of "avenging Khamenei": both sides are packaging their military actions as a response to "victims," and this packaging often ignites public opinion more easily than the strategy itself. Iran previously claimed US casualties in its operation against US facilities in Bahrain, but publicly available information suggests that Bahrain's recorded casualties are relatively limited. The actual recent US deaths were concentrated in an attack on an airbase in Jordan and a drone dismantling incident in northern Iraq. It's difficult to understand why new tensions have arisen during the funeral of Iran's Supreme Leader. Normally, a period of national mourning should be a time for de-escalation, but the opposite is true—during the funeral, calls emerged within Iran to "kill" the US leader, prompting Trump to issue a threatening response on social media. This should have been a window of calm, but instead, the conflict has escalated further. Iran has vowed revenge for Khamenei, and some media outlets have even included Trump, Netanyahu, Rubio, and others on an assassination list. However, this list was released by a conservative media outlet closely linked to the Tehran city government, and there is no clear indication that it has received official Iranian approval—this ambiguous "semi-official" nature may well be a deliberate strategy. Iran's current Supreme Leader, Mojtaba, made a rare statement that day, vowing revenge "will definitely take place," but this wording could also be interpreted as a way of postponing the fulfillment of his promise, turning revenge into a suspenseful political asset that can be invoked at any time but does not need to be implemented immediately. The strong nationalist sentiment displayed at Khamenei's funeral clearly emboldened Iran's hardliners. One interpretation is that Iran believes the United States has once again violated the previously reached memorandum of understanding, thus necessitating a recalibration of its position. Another view suggests that the problem may not lie in the willingness of either side to "talk," but rather in the fact that the tasks assigned to the frontline negotiators by the top decision-makers of both sides inherently carry uncompromising red lines—negotiators have no real authority to bridge the differences and can only mechanically reiterate their respective bottom lines. If this assessment holds true, then the repeated reversals and accusations of "breach of contract" surrounding the memorandum's terms may not stem from problems with the text itself, but rather from negotiators being held hostage from the outset, with any minor disagreement being magnified into a "breach of contract." Previous reports have also indicated that the current Supreme Leader himself did not actually intend to negotiate with the United States, only reluctantly agreeing under pressure from the President. If true, this implies internal divisions within Iran regarding its policy towards the US, making it difficult for outsiders to determine which faction's will any signals Iran releases in the future represent. Furthermore, domestic nationalist sentiment must also be considered—Khamenei's death, the ongoing war, and continuous US bombing could easily push domestic sentiment to a critical point where a "tough stance" is necessary for self-consistency. Following the escalation of tensions, Trump clearly displayed emotional fluctuations. According to ABC News, at the NATO summit press conference on July 8th, he used highly abusive language to describe the Iranian leadership, but simultaneously left room for negotiation, indicating that negotiators might continue to engage with Iran in the future. Against this backdrop, the US and Iran did indeed conduct bombing raids for several days, with one side continuously striking targets within Iran and the other retaliating against US facilities in Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, and other locations. The US strategic objectives themselves appear to be in a state of constant flux: from "denuclearization" to a brief period of "seizing Iranian oil," and now leaning towards "forcing Iran back to the negotiating table." This shifting objective makes it difficult to determine whether this military operation has a stable end result. Even if Iran expresses a willingness to negotiate, the US may not immediately cease military operations—the negotiations at Bürgenburg, Switzerland, saw the Iranian delegation refuse to return to the negotiating table after Trump made threatening remarks. A more likely scenario is that both sides will again enter a cycle of alternating negotiations and war until one side makes a truly decisive and irreversible choice. In this case, oil prices are likely to fluctuate around current levels in the short term—a decline due to improved negotiating conditions and a surge due to a sudden escalation of conflict; these two forces pulling in opposite directions make it difficult to form a clear unilateral trend. Whether the future will lead to escalation or converge into genuine negotiations remains highly uncertain.