Last week, the Federal Reserve raised the target range for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 3.75% to 4.00%, with a vote of 12-0. The summary of economic projections released concurrently with the decision was again one point short. Fed Chairman Kevin Warsh declined to submit his personal projections for the second consecutive time. The dot plot remains on paper, but the procedural basis for the committee's collective outlook has been weakened. Looking back at the meeting on September 22, what the market truly needs to analyze is not the phrase "returning to the 2% target more promptly" in the decision text, but rather whether and in what form the Fed will continue to publish these projections. The latest summary shows that, among the 18 committee members excluding Warsh, the median forecast for U.S. real GDP growth in 2026 has been revised upward from 2.2% in June to 2.3%, and in 2027 from 2.3% to 2.4%. The median unemployment rate has been revised downward from 4.3% to 4.1%, and is expected to remain at the same level from 2026 to 2029. The personal consumption expenditures price index has been revised upward from 3.6% in 2026 to 3.7%, and the core figure has been revised upward from 3.3% to 3.4%, with the median path pushing the 2% target to 2029. Correspondingly, the median federal funds rate at the end of the year is expected to rise from 3.8% to 4.1% in 2026, from 3.6% to 4.1% in 2027, and from 3.4% to 3.9% in 2028, while the long-term neutral level has slightly increased from 3.1% to 3.2%. Of the 18 points, 16 indicate at least one more shift this year, 4 indicate two more shifts, and 2 indicate no change. The numbers themselves are clear; the question is: do these figures still represent the committee's official outlook?

The Federal Reserve Chairman's second absence caused the forecast summary to stagnate.

For the Summary of Economic Projections to be valid, it requires all committee members to submit their forecasts according to the same rules. The Fed Chair's absence for two consecutive rounds effectively changed this tool from a "full-staff assessment" to a "majority-based operation with the top leader observing." Warsh had already stated in June that the current summary "does not help policy operations," and indicated that a new communication framework would likely be developed by the end of 2026 to address criticism of his "long-term holding." At the April hearing, his statement was even more direct: the Fed is also composed of people, and committee members "will hold onto those forecasts longer than they should"; he also clearly stated, "I do not believe that we should announce in advance what a future decision will be." At the September press conference, when asked why the median path would delay price stability until 2029, Warsh drew a clear line: those were not his forecasts. In his Jackson Hole speech, he elaborated on the discomfort of making long-term statements: prematurely announcing future policy decisions creates ambiguity under the guise of "clarity," and excessive sharing of deliberations and over-commitment to paths could mislead markets, businesses, and households. The procedural consequences are very specific. The committee cannot indefinitely release this material as the "official master assessment" given the Federal Reserve Chairman's resistance. Transparency requirements cannot be met by deleting documents, but the current text already exhibits systemic flaws: the same material is being used by the market as a policy signal while simultaneously being rejected by the Federal Reserve Chairman himself. This flaw is more concerning than a few basis points shift in the dot plot, because it alters the status of the communication tool, not just the median for a particular year.

Dot plots provide a collection of opinions, but do not provide a policy narrative.

The fundamental flaw of the dot plot lies not in its discreteness, but in its inability to be summed. Growth, unemployment, inflation, and the "appropriate interest rate" are all submitted anonymously and are not linked to the same set of shock identification methods. Outsiders cannot determine whether a high interest rate point corresponds to overheated demand, continuous supply disruptions, or a recalibration of the neutral interest rate. Numbers lacking a narrative can only be interpreted as sentiment, not as a reaction function. Chicago Federal Reserve Bank President Austan Goolsby's 2024 critique remains valid: these forecasts are "just a bunch of opinions without economic content." Former Chairman Ben Bernanke pointed out in 2025 that the summary overemphasizes central forecasts and fails to provide "more specific policy guidance depending on how the economy evolves." Former Vice Chairman Donald Cohn's assessment is even more somber: the summary creates "false precision," and the committee should stop publishing those often meaningless median adjustments. The risk and uncertainty appendix is equally ineffective. Committee members are asked to compare current uncertainty to the average of the past 20 years, a sample that includes financial crises. On record, the committee has almost never acknowledged that the uncertainty of a variable is below its historical average in its aggregate calculations. The risks are skewed to the upside. US inflation was written as declining before 2021 and rising afterwards, while unemployment is skewed to the upside and growth to the downside, almost always the more pessimistic side.

The market places less weight on the pricing of dot plots than on their literal meaning.

A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago this month provides a testable resilience: if the median interest rate unexpectedly rises by 25 basis points, the market's immediate adjustment to the policy rate path is only about 5 basis points. The market doesn't treat the dot plot as a commitment, but rather as a noisy assessment of conditions. The tightening of interest rate expectations after last week's meeting was also limited, consistent with this resilience. The dot plot can still move pricing, but the coefficient is much smaller than the literal interpretation of "median equals policy." Another piece of evidence cannot be ignored. Internal research within the Federal Reserve System shows that the summary's predictive power for future outcomes is often better than the prevailing private sector consensus, making it natural for private sector forecasters to rely on it to some extent. These two pieces of evidence are not contradictory: the summary contains information, but that information is discounted; it can adjust expectations, but it cannot prescribe a path. For traders, what's useful is not treating the 18-point figure as a vote forecast, but rather observing whether the median revision moves in the same direction as the statement's wording and the boundaries of the press conference. In September, the statement emphasized a "more timely" return to the target, but the Fed Chair refused to accept the median target being postponed to 2029. This gap itself is a signal. It's also important to pay attention to the distribution, not just the median. The target at the end of 2026 is expected to concentrate in the 4.00% to 4.25% range, with less divergence than in some previous quarters, but in 2027, there will still be members who see both easing and higher interest rates. The median has changed from "a cut next year" to "flat next year," shifting the narrative focus, not welding the committee into a single path. Depicting a 0.1 percentage point shift in the median as a policy turning point is precisely the false precision Cohn criticized.

The real variable is the reshaping of the communication framework.

Whether or not to abandon the dot plot depends on the alternative. Simply stopping the release of summaries would compromise transparency and accountability. The committee's collective assessment of output, employment, prices, and the appropriate policy path remains the primary text for external scrutiny of its reaction function. What needs to be eliminated is the "anonymous dot plot plus median" presentation, not the forecast itself. Warsh's timeline is a new communication framework by the end of 2026. Some analysts believe that for alternative arrangements to be superior to the current situation, at least three shortcomings must be addressed. First, forecasts must include a mechanism explaining whether interest rate points correspond to demand, supply, or the neutral interest rate assumption. Second, uncertainty can no longer be compared emptyly to the 20-year average including crisis samples; it must show the range and conditions for key variables. Third, policy guidance should explicitly rely on data evolution, rather than repackaging quarterly median adjustments as new narratives. Bernanke's "potential guidance," Goolsby's "economic content," and Cohn's "removing meaningless precision" all point to the same thing: fewer scattered points and more testable reaction functions.