With three weeks to go before the US midterm elections on November 3, recent prediction market expectations have remained largely unchanged. Despite the continued intensification of campaign advertising and voter rallies, and slight fluctuations in various traditional polling data, event prediction markets like Polymarket have maintained consistent pricing, reflecting that trading funds have not significantly repriced their assessment of the final outcome of this election. Polymarket currently estimates the probability of Democrats gaining full control of both the House and Senate at 60%-65%. The market generally believes the Democrats have a very high chance of winning the House, with a probability of approximately 90%. The Senate race is more unpredictable, but still leans towards the Democrats, with a current probability of a 63.5% win. Prediction markets are essentially probability-based pricing based on participants' betting. Compared to static polls, they continuously incorporate incremental information such as campaign spending, candidate sentiment, and unforeseen events, making them an important reference indicator for global macro investors assessing US political risk. This term has 100 Senate seats, 35 of which will be up for election. Nine seats are considered safe for the Democrats, 14 for the Republicans, and the remaining 12 are highly contested swing seats. The Republicans need to win 5 of these seats to reach 50 and secure a majority in the Senate through the vice-presidential vote. The Democrats need to win 8 seats to achieve a majority of 51. Prediction markets still expect the Democrats to win 9 of these 12 swing seats. Some seats that were previously considered Republican sureties have now shifted in favor of the Democrats. In Texas, the Republicans have only a 35% chance of winning, and in Ohio, the chances are 40%. Texas has been Republican-controlled since 1960, and Ohio since 1992. Competition for other seats, such as Kansas and Iowa, is also intensifying, but the market still favors Republicans to win these two states. The loosening of traditionally deep-red states is driven by a confluence of factors, including demographic shifts, polarized social issues, and the characteristics of both candidates. This forces Republicans to allocate significant campaign resources to their core states, diverting funds and energy from traditional swing states. As a baseline scenario, the election results are not expected to significantly alter the fiscal policy outlook. Whether the Democrats ultimately control Congress or there is a two-party system, a divided government will make fiscal policy more predictable. If the Democrats at least win the House of Representatives, Republicans will be unable to push through budget reconciliation bills that would widen the fiscal deficit. Similarly, even if the Democrats gain a simple majority in both the House and Senate, Trump can still veto a budget bill submitted by a Democratic-led Congress. Overturning a Trump veto requires a two-thirds majority in both the House and Senate, which in reality is only achievable with bipartisan support. The budget reconciliation process is a core tool for the US Congress to bypass lengthy debates and advance fiscal bills. If this tool is restricted by Republicans, the legislative avenues for large-scale tax cuts and new spending bills will significantly narrow. The existence of the presidential veto further institutionally locks in the space for unilateral fiscal policy adjustments, significantly reducing the risk of black swan events. The outcome of the House election is relatively more important than the Senate election. If the Democrats regain a majority in the House, then regardless of the Senate election results, the tone of US fiscal policy for 2027-2028 will essentially be set. This could benefit risk market sentiment and strengthen the US dollar.