The US-Iran covert conflict: In the Iraqi chess game, who will win the protracted war with patience?
2026-04-21 16:06:19
The current prime ministerial candidate will be determined before April 26. If hardline pro-Iranian figures such as Badri and Maliki within the Coordinating Framework come to power , they will further restrict the United States' operational space in Iraq, putting the United States in a more passive position in the overall US-Iran war.
On April 11, 2026, the Iraqi National Assembly elected Nizar Amedi as the new president, marking the end of a 15-month political deadlock that had lasted since the parliamentary elections in November 2025.
As a core member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Amedi's political foundation is deeply intertwined with the political forces supported by Iran. His rise to power has generally leaned towards the Iranian position, which is clearly detrimental to the United States' strategic layout in Iraq and directly weakens the United States' initiative in the regional conflict.
This election not only reshaped Iraq's political landscape but also became the latest footnote to the power struggle between the United States and Iran in Iraq.
Amid escalating regional tensions, Iran's move to delegate command authority over Iraqi militias to field commanders stands in stark contrast to the US sanctions and military strikes against Iranian-backed armed groups. These details clearly demonstrate the difference in the two countries' patience and battlefield control in Iraq.
Driven by the pressure of the joint US-Israeli strike on Iran on February 28, Iran has granted its field commanders greater autonomy in decision-making over militias in Iraq, allowing some armed groups to operate without Tehran's approval.
Three militia members and two informed officials revealed that this adjustment was a key lesson Iran learned from the 12-day war in June—the highly centralized command model at that time exposed the drawbacks of slow response, and after the war, Iran decided to significantly decentralize battlefield autonomy.
In the Iraqi Kurdish region, the Iranian delegation stated bluntly that if militia attacks on US military bases, commercial facilities, and diplomatic missions escalate, the Iraqi Kurds do not need to appeal to Tehran, as Iran has delegated command authority to its field commanders in the region and is no longer able to intervene.
This shift signifies that Iranian-backed militias have officially moved to a decentralized management model, with each armed force now authorized to act independently based on battlefield assessments without needing to report to the central command.
The results of Iraq's November 2025 parliamentary elections show that the "Reconstruction and Development Alliance," led by incumbent Prime Minister Soudanin, won 46 seats, making it the largest party in parliament. The "Coordination Framework Alliance," which includes Soudanin and political groups such as the "Law of the People Alliance" led by former Prime Minister Maliki, continues to be the largest party group in parliament.
However, this political landscape highlights the core paradox of the Iraqi government's control over militias: the Iranian-backed armed factions that it claims it cannot control are precisely the armed groups belonging to the political forces that supported the current government's rise to power.
The "Coordination Framework Alliance," composed of pro-Iranian Shiite core factions, promoted Soudani to prime minister in 2022. Currently, Iraq is mired in a political deadlock, and Soudani serves as interim prime minister until the formation of a new government.
The rise of President Amedi and the potential election of a hardline prime minister are both political developments unfavorable to the United States, and will continue to reduce the US military and political presence in Iraq.
The militias that launched the attacks against U.S. targets were not independent armed groups, but rather belonged to Iraq's national-level Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This organization was formed after the fall of Mosul in 2014 with the aim of formalizing anti-ISIS volunteer armed groups. It has now developed into a powerful armed group with strength surpassing that of the Iraqi regular army. Its members receive state salaries and can allocate state resources such as weapons and intelligence.
Critics argue that this creates a sharp contradiction: some state-sponsored armed groups are pursuing Iranian strategic intentions, and even if this harms Iraq's national interests, it will directly worsen the security environment and strategic posture of the United States in the Iraq war.
Although Soudani introduced limited measures to try to suppress the influence of the militias, including further integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces into the state system and occasionally replacing commanders who violated regulations, these measures were strongly resisted by the militias. Pushing for the institutionalization of the armed forces only made them more deeply embedded in the Iraqi state system and made it more difficult for the United States to eliminate the armed forces that threaten it at their root.
Iran's "deep cultivation" and strategic patience
Iran's strategy toward Iraq demonstrates remarkable long-term patience, with its core being "deep embedding" rather than "direct control":
The strategic wisdom of decentralization: Iran did not simply relinquish control, but rather achieved a balance between "decentralized response" and "strategic centralized control" by decentralizing battlefield command.
This model enhances the militia's flexibility in responding to US strikes while avoiding command failures caused by excessive centralization, reflecting Iran's profound understanding of the complex situation in Iraq.
Political and military ties: Mehdi Qabi, a spokesman for the Iranian-backed militia group Hezbollah's Nujaba Movement, stated that the group has an alliance with Iran, while insisting that it adheres to the Iraqi political order and supports the Iraqi government and governance in accordance with national interests.
This "dual identity" positioning allows Iranian-backed armed groups to maintain strategic autonomy while gaining legitimacy through the Iraqi state system, demonstrating Iran's precise grasp of the Iraqi political landscape.
Battlefield restraint and precise targeting: In recent fighting, the top leadership of Iraqi core militias have clearly withdrawn from frontline combat deployments and have not directly participated in the command of operations. The US strikes have mainly resulted in casualties among mid-level commanders, with no core high-ranking officers injured or killed in the strikes.
This strategy of "sacrificing the middle ranks to preserve the core" avoids a full-scale confrontation with the United States while preserving the strength for a long-term game, demonstrating Iran's strategic restraint and patience.
The US's "high-pressure intervention" and tactical haste
The US strategy toward Iraq exhibits a clear tactical haste, its core being a dual pressure of "military strikes" and "political pressure":
Immediateness of Sanctions and Strikes: Last Friday, the United States imposed sanctions on seven commanders and key members of four Iranian-backed Iraqi militia groups. This followed a precision strike against advisory teams of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the killing of three advisors who were meeting at their operational command post in the upscale Jadriya neighborhood of Baghdad.
While this "targeted elimination" tactic can quickly weaken the enemy's combat capabilities, it is difficult to solve the problem at its root and may instead exacerbate the conflict.
The short-sightedness of political interference: U.S. State Department Deputy Spokesperson Tommy Bigott said the U.S. demands that the Iraqi government immediately take all necessary measures to dismantle the Iranian-backed militias.
This demand for "immediate results" ignores the complexity of Iraq's political landscape—the Coordination Framework Alliance, as the largest parliamentary group, is essentially composed of political forces affiliated with Iranian-backed militias, and the Iraqi government is simply incapable of "disintegrating" these armed groups in the short term.
Limitations of battlefield objectives: Michael Knights, research director at HorizonEngage, a geopolitical risk consultancy that tracks attacks, points out that the U.S. did not target senior militia leaders, but rather focused on eliminating advisory teams to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
While this tactical choice may weaken Iran's direct influence over the militias, it cannot change the fact that the militias are deeply embedded in the Iraqi state system, reflecting the United States' insufficient control over the situation in Iraq.
Through battlefield details and political maneuvering, Iran clearly showed more patience with Iraq and greater flexibility on the battlefield:
Adaptability of the command model: Iran learned from the June conflict and quickly adjusted its command model, delegating battlefield autonomy and enabling militia organizations to respond quickly to the actual battlefield situation, demonstrating strong strategic flexibility.
In contrast, the United States' strike strategy has remained at the level of "targeted killing" and "sanctions and pressure," failing to make effective adjustments to address the decentralized management model of Iranian-backed armed groups.
Political and military synergy: Iranian-affiliated militias can maintain strategic synergy with Iran while gaining legitimacy within the Iraqi political system, forming a complete closed loop of "military operations - political cover - social support".
The US intervention, however, presents the problem of "military strikes being disconnected from political objectives"—strikes against militia groups may weaken the Iraqi government's ruling foundation and thus hinder the US from promoting a government formation process that is "less influenced by militia forces".
Maturity of risk management: While promoting the decentralized management of militias, Iran also made its position clear to the Iraqi Kurdish authorities in advance, stating that it could not control the armed groups in southern Iraq, thereby avoiding direct conflict with Kurdish forces and demonstrating its mature risk management capabilities.
The United States, without fully considering the political realities of Iraq, made unrealistic demands on the Iraqi government to "immediately dismantle the militias," which further deteriorated US-Iraq relations and weakened US influence in Iraq.
With Amedi's election as the new president of Iraq, Iraq's political landscape has entered a new phase, and the rivalry between the US and Iraq in Iraq will also take on a new form.
The rise to power of a pro-Iranian president and the potential victory of a hardline prime minister are both extremely unfavorable political situations for the United States, directly weakening its advantageous position in the overall US-Iran conflict.
Iranian-backed militias have made it clear that they will support the new Iraqi government on the premise that it aligns with national interests. This "conditional support" preserves strategic autonomy while laying the foundation for Iran's long-term presence in Iraq.
In contrast, while the United States attempted to weaken the influence of Iranian-backed militias through military strikes and political pressure, it faced enormous resistance from the political realities of Iraq. The Coordination Framework Coalition, as the largest parliamentary group, was essentially composed of political forces affiliated with Iranian-backed militias, and the new Iraqi government was simply unable to meet the United States' demand to "dismantle the militias" in the short term.
As Michael Knights stated, while the United States retains the autonomy to conduct military strikes against Iraqi militias, this move will likely prompt the U.S. to intervene and help form a new Iraqi government less influenced by militia forces.
However, judging from the current situation, the United States' goal faces numerous challenges, while Iran, with its long-term patience and precise strategy towards Iraq, has gained a more advantageous position in this game, demonstrating stronger battlefield control and strategic flexibility.
Summarize:
The smoke of the US-Iran war continues to linger in the strategically important region of Iraq, and the current power struggle has clearly outlined the underlying logic of this conflict: the US is subtracting, while Iran is adding. In this geopolitical game filled with fragmented armed groups and complex religious backgrounds, whoever can endure the longer period of chaos and ambiguity will be the ultimate winner.
The United States is trapped in a tactical impatience for "immediate results." While high-pressure sanctions and targeted strikes can create short-term pain, they have never been able to dismantle the foundation of Iranian-backed armed groups.
More importantly, the results of Iraq's presidential election and the upcoming prime ministerial candidate present several unfavorable scenarios for the United States: the inauguration of the pro-Iranian Amedi as president and the potential appointment of hardliners such as Badri and Maliki as prime ministers will thoroughly consolidate Iran's political advantage in Iraq, making it difficult for the United States to effectively contain Iranian proxy forces within Iraq and directly hindering the United States' deployment and progress in the overall US-Iran war effort.
The course of this war has long since transcended the contest of victory or defeat on the battlefield, becoming a strategic showdown between patience and impatience, and between deep cultivation and superficial efforts. Iran is using time to buy space, turning Iraq into a "proxy battlefield" that is difficult to break through in the US-Iran war. Meanwhile, the US's short-sightedness, coupled with Iraq's successive political setbacks, is causing it to gradually lose the initiative in this protracted war. Every political change and battlefield adjustment in Iraq is proving that the balance of power in the US-Iran war is slowly tilting towards the side with greater strategic patience and a deeper understanding of cultivation.
On April 11, 2026, the Iraqi National Assembly elected Nizar Amedi as the new president, marking the end of a 15-month political deadlock that had lasted since the parliamentary elections in November 2025.
As a core member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Amedi's political foundation is deeply intertwined with the political forces supported by Iran. His rise to power has generally leaned towards the Iranian position, which is clearly detrimental to the United States' strategic layout in Iraq and directly weakens the United States' initiative in the regional conflict.
This election not only reshaped Iraq's political landscape but also became the latest footnote to the power struggle between the United States and Iran in Iraq.
Amid escalating regional tensions, Iran's move to delegate command authority over Iraqi militias to field commanders stands in stark contrast to the US sanctions and military strikes against Iranian-backed armed groups. These details clearly demonstrate the difference in the two countries' patience and battlefield control in Iraq.
Command Transformation Driven by War
Driven by the pressure of the joint US-Israeli strike on Iran on February 28, Iran has granted its field commanders greater autonomy in decision-making over militias in Iraq, allowing some armed groups to operate without Tehran's approval.
Three militia members and two informed officials revealed that this adjustment was a key lesson Iran learned from the 12-day war in June—the highly centralized command model at that time exposed the drawbacks of slow response, and after the war, Iran decided to significantly decentralize battlefield autonomy.
In the Iraqi Kurdish region, the Iranian delegation stated bluntly that if militia attacks on US military bases, commercial facilities, and diplomatic missions escalate, the Iraqi Kurds do not need to appeal to Tehran, as Iran has delegated command authority to its field commanders in the region and is no longer able to intervene.
This shift signifies that Iranian-backed militias have officially moved to a decentralized management model, with each armed force now authorized to act independently based on battlefield assessments without needing to report to the central command.
Iraq's political predicament under the shadow of elections
The results of Iraq's November 2025 parliamentary elections show that the "Reconstruction and Development Alliance," led by incumbent Prime Minister Soudanin, won 46 seats, making it the largest party in parliament. The "Coordination Framework Alliance," which includes Soudanin and political groups such as the "Law of the People Alliance" led by former Prime Minister Maliki, continues to be the largest party group in parliament.
However, this political landscape highlights the core paradox of the Iraqi government's control over militias: the Iranian-backed armed factions that it claims it cannot control are precisely the armed groups belonging to the political forces that supported the current government's rise to power.
The "Coordination Framework Alliance," composed of pro-Iranian Shiite core factions, promoted Soudani to prime minister in 2022. Currently, Iraq is mired in a political deadlock, and Soudani serves as interim prime minister until the formation of a new government.
The rise of President Amedi and the potential election of a hardline prime minister are both political developments unfavorable to the United States, and will continue to reduce the US military and political presence in Iraq.
The militias that launched the attacks against U.S. targets were not independent armed groups, but rather belonged to Iraq's national-level Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This organization was formed after the fall of Mosul in 2014 with the aim of formalizing anti-ISIS volunteer armed groups. It has now developed into a powerful armed group with strength surpassing that of the Iraqi regular army. Its members receive state salaries and can allocate state resources such as weapons and intelligence.
Critics argue that this creates a sharp contradiction: some state-sponsored armed groups are pursuing Iranian strategic intentions, and even if this harms Iraq's national interests, it will directly worsen the security environment and strategic posture of the United States in the Iraq war.
Although Soudani introduced limited measures to try to suppress the influence of the militias, including further integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces into the state system and occasionally replacing commanders who violated regulations, these measures were strongly resisted by the militias. Pushing for the institutionalization of the armed forces only made them more deeply embedded in the Iraqi state system and made it more difficult for the United States to eliminate the armed forces that threaten it at their root.
A Comparison of US and Iran Strategies: A Mirror Image of Patience and Battlefield Performance
Iran's "deep cultivation" and strategic patience
Iran's strategy toward Iraq demonstrates remarkable long-term patience, with its core being "deep embedding" rather than "direct control":
The strategic wisdom of decentralization: Iran did not simply relinquish control, but rather achieved a balance between "decentralized response" and "strategic centralized control" by decentralizing battlefield command.
This model enhances the militia's flexibility in responding to US strikes while avoiding command failures caused by excessive centralization, reflecting Iran's profound understanding of the complex situation in Iraq.
Political and military ties: Mehdi Qabi, a spokesman for the Iranian-backed militia group Hezbollah's Nujaba Movement, stated that the group has an alliance with Iran, while insisting that it adheres to the Iraqi political order and supports the Iraqi government and governance in accordance with national interests.
This "dual identity" positioning allows Iranian-backed armed groups to maintain strategic autonomy while gaining legitimacy through the Iraqi state system, demonstrating Iran's precise grasp of the Iraqi political landscape.
Battlefield restraint and precise targeting: In recent fighting, the top leadership of Iraqi core militias have clearly withdrawn from frontline combat deployments and have not directly participated in the command of operations. The US strikes have mainly resulted in casualties among mid-level commanders, with no core high-ranking officers injured or killed in the strikes.
This strategy of "sacrificing the middle ranks to preserve the core" avoids a full-scale confrontation with the United States while preserving the strength for a long-term game, demonstrating Iran's strategic restraint and patience.
The US's "high-pressure intervention" and tactical haste
The US strategy toward Iraq exhibits a clear tactical haste, its core being a dual pressure of "military strikes" and "political pressure":
Immediateness of Sanctions and Strikes: Last Friday, the United States imposed sanctions on seven commanders and key members of four Iranian-backed Iraqi militia groups. This followed a precision strike against advisory teams of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the killing of three advisors who were meeting at their operational command post in the upscale Jadriya neighborhood of Baghdad.
While this "targeted elimination" tactic can quickly weaken the enemy's combat capabilities, it is difficult to solve the problem at its root and may instead exacerbate the conflict.
The short-sightedness of political interference: U.S. State Department Deputy Spokesperson Tommy Bigott said the U.S. demands that the Iraqi government immediately take all necessary measures to dismantle the Iranian-backed militias.
This demand for "immediate results" ignores the complexity of Iraq's political landscape—the Coordination Framework Alliance, as the largest parliamentary group, is essentially composed of political forces affiliated with Iranian-backed militias, and the Iraqi government is simply incapable of "disintegrating" these armed groups in the short term.
Limitations of battlefield objectives: Michael Knights, research director at HorizonEngage, a geopolitical risk consultancy that tracks attacks, points out that the U.S. did not target senior militia leaders, but rather focused on eliminating advisory teams to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
While this tactical choice may weaken Iran's direct influence over the militias, it cannot change the fact that the militias are deeply embedded in the Iraqi state system, reflecting the United States' insufficient control over the situation in Iraq.
Patience and mastery of the battlefield prove it.
Through battlefield details and political maneuvering, Iran clearly showed more patience with Iraq and greater flexibility on the battlefield:
Adaptability of the command model: Iran learned from the June conflict and quickly adjusted its command model, delegating battlefield autonomy and enabling militia organizations to respond quickly to the actual battlefield situation, demonstrating strong strategic flexibility.
In contrast, the United States' strike strategy has remained at the level of "targeted killing" and "sanctions and pressure," failing to make effective adjustments to address the decentralized management model of Iranian-backed armed groups.
Political and military synergy: Iranian-affiliated militias can maintain strategic synergy with Iran while gaining legitimacy within the Iraqi political system, forming a complete closed loop of "military operations - political cover - social support".
The US intervention, however, presents the problem of "military strikes being disconnected from political objectives"—strikes against militia groups may weaken the Iraqi government's ruling foundation and thus hinder the US from promoting a government formation process that is "less influenced by militia forces".
Maturity of risk management: While promoting the decentralized management of militias, Iran also made its position clear to the Iraqi Kurdish authorities in advance, stating that it could not control the armed groups in southern Iraq, thereby avoiding direct conflict with Kurdish forces and demonstrating its mature risk management capabilities.
The United States, without fully considering the political realities of Iraq, made unrealistic demands on the Iraqi government to "immediately dismantle the militias," which further deteriorated US-Iraq relations and weakened US influence in Iraq.
Post-election game prospects
With Amedi's election as the new president of Iraq, Iraq's political landscape has entered a new phase, and the rivalry between the US and Iraq in Iraq will also take on a new form.
The rise to power of a pro-Iranian president and the potential victory of a hardline prime minister are both extremely unfavorable political situations for the United States, directly weakening its advantageous position in the overall US-Iran conflict.
Iranian-backed militias have made it clear that they will support the new Iraqi government on the premise that it aligns with national interests. This "conditional support" preserves strategic autonomy while laying the foundation for Iran's long-term presence in Iraq.
In contrast, while the United States attempted to weaken the influence of Iranian-backed militias through military strikes and political pressure, it faced enormous resistance from the political realities of Iraq. The Coordination Framework Coalition, as the largest parliamentary group, was essentially composed of political forces affiliated with Iranian-backed militias, and the new Iraqi government was simply unable to meet the United States' demand to "dismantle the militias" in the short term.
As Michael Knights stated, while the United States retains the autonomy to conduct military strikes against Iraqi militias, this move will likely prompt the U.S. to intervene and help form a new Iraqi government less influenced by militia forces.
However, judging from the current situation, the United States' goal faces numerous challenges, while Iran, with its long-term patience and precise strategy towards Iraq, has gained a more advantageous position in this game, demonstrating stronger battlefield control and strategic flexibility.
Summarize:
The smoke of the US-Iran war continues to linger in the strategically important region of Iraq, and the current power struggle has clearly outlined the underlying logic of this conflict: the US is subtracting, while Iran is adding. In this geopolitical game filled with fragmented armed groups and complex religious backgrounds, whoever can endure the longer period of chaos and ambiguity will be the ultimate winner.
The United States is trapped in a tactical impatience for "immediate results." While high-pressure sanctions and targeted strikes can create short-term pain, they have never been able to dismantle the foundation of Iranian-backed armed groups.
More importantly, the results of Iraq's presidential election and the upcoming prime ministerial candidate present several unfavorable scenarios for the United States: the inauguration of the pro-Iranian Amedi as president and the potential appointment of hardliners such as Badri and Maliki as prime ministers will thoroughly consolidate Iran's political advantage in Iraq, making it difficult for the United States to effectively contain Iranian proxy forces within Iraq and directly hindering the United States' deployment and progress in the overall US-Iran war effort.
The course of this war has long since transcended the contest of victory or defeat on the battlefield, becoming a strategic showdown between patience and impatience, and between deep cultivation and superficial efforts. Iran is using time to buy space, turning Iraq into a "proxy battlefield" that is difficult to break through in the US-Iran war. Meanwhile, the US's short-sightedness, coupled with Iraq's successive political setbacks, is causing it to gradually lose the initiative in this protracted war. Every political change and battlefield adjustment in Iraq is proving that the balance of power in the US-Iran war is slowly tilting towards the side with greater strategic patience and a deeper understanding of cultivation.
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