The military action against Iran, originally led by the United States and Israel, was strategically envisioned to completely destroy Iran's ability to resist. However, as the war progressed and subtle changes occurred at the negotiating table, the warring parties are gradually moving towards a provisional agreement. The core reality of this potential agreement is that while Iran has suffered heavy blows, it has not been truly defeated. Post-war Iran's economic foundation and military-industrial complex will be severely weakened; however, its most influential political force—the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—may actually maintain a more secure grip on power than before the war.

I. The essence of a temporary agreement: a suspension, not a termination.

Sources familiar with the negotiations revealed that even if a memorandum to end the current fighting is reached in the near future, it is more likely to be a temporary ceasefire rather than a lasting strategic breakthrough.

It is widely believed that this arrangement is essentially a stopgap measure. Its primary objective is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which has been effectively blocked by Iran, as soon as possible, thereby alleviating the severe turmoil in global financial markets and reducing the extreme economic pressure on Iran itself.

Furthermore, the agreement also provides US President Trump with a political escape route, allowing him to showcase diplomatic achievements to domestic voters. As for the deep-seated contradictions that could actually trigger a war, all parties tacitly agreed to postpone them until "later."

II. Military Victory, Strategic Gap

Dennis Ross, a former senior U.S. diplomat, commented that the U.S.-Israeli coalition had indeed achieved remarkable military successes at the tactical level, such as destroying some of Iran's missile facilities and air defense systems. However, from a strategic perspective, these military advances did not bring any substantial solutions. All the core issues that led to the conflict—Iran's uranium enrichment rights, the lack of U.S. security guarantees, and Israel's zero-tolerance attitude towards existential threats—remained unchanged.

In other words, a costly war only yields localized advantages on the battlefield, not a final political outcome.

III. Why is the "common ground" between the US and Iran so extremely limited?

According to a proposed memorandum described by sources familiar with the matter, the agreement would likely include: Iran lifting its de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the unfreezing of some of its overseas assets, or a limited easing of certain U.S. sanctions. Iranian officials privately view this arrangement as a time-buying strategy—to mitigate domestic social risks by securing emergency financial assistance while avoiding any fundamentally contentious issues, such as abandoning uranium enrichment activities.

For Trump, with the upcoming November midterm elections looming, he hopes this agreement text will serve as evidence of "progress" on the Iranian nuclear issue, particularly regarding limits on highly enriched uranium stockpiles. However, former diplomat Alan Ayr, who has served as an expert on US-Iran affairs, points out that what Trump politically needs and what Iran is actually willing to offer, while superficially similar, have very little overlap. The current approach by both sides is to reach a preliminary agreement, pushing all thorny issues to a so-called "second phase" for resolution, but historical experience suggests that the second phase may never materialize.

IV. The Hidden Dangers and Costs Behind a Short-Term Ceasefire

According to two regional sources familiar with the negotiations, Trump may ultimately only secure a short-term ceasefire agreement, coupled with vague commitments from Iran regarding uranium enrichment. More symbolically, Iran will retain de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, despite deep concerns from Israel and Gulf states, Washington has essentially abandoned its initial demand that Iran dismantle all its ballistic missiles.

Sources also indicated that while Trump publicly denied the allegations, he had privately accepted the reality of linking the situation in Lebanon with the Strait of Hormuz issue. He is urging Israel to halt its military strikes on Beirut and its southern suburbs to avoid further escalation and disruption of the negotiation process. Iran, on the other hand, has made it clear that the immediate unfreezing of approximately $12 billion in overseas assets is a core precondition for agreeing to an agreement; without this, nothing further can be discussed.

David Schenker, an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, warned that Trump has consistently tried to avoid comparisons to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal reached by the Obama administration. However, the act of unfreezing Iranian funds is itself highly likely to draw similar criticism. He believes Trump will find it difficult to completely avoid such political analogies.

V. Who are the real beneficiaries of the interim agreement?

What worries analysts even more is that even a temporary ceasefire could have political consequences that run counter to the US's original intentions. Any form of cessation of conflict could make the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' power position within the country even more unshakeable. In the past, the Revolutionary Guard was somewhat of a behind-the-scenes power holder; after this war, they have almost become power itself. A provisional agreement is likely to make Israel extremely uneasy, because the Iranian leadership has always defined this war from an ideological perspective. For Iran, no agreement can fundamentally resolve the existential conflict with Israel. As Dennis Ross stated, "For Israel and Iran, one phase of this war may have ended, but the conflict itself is far from over."

In conclusion: Ceasefires are easy, peace is extremely difficult.

In short, the provisional agreement currently being drafted is more like a band-aid to alleviate the immediate crisis for all parties, rather than a scalpel to cure the chronic disease. It can temporarily stop the bleeding, reopen shipping lanes, and provide politicians with propaganda capital, but it deliberately avoids all the core landmines such as uranium enrichment, security guarantees, and missile programs. For investors, it is crucial to understand that a pause in the war does not equate to the disappearance of the conflict. While Iran has suffered heavy losses, its core remains intact; while the United States has achieved a tactical victory, it has yet to claim strategic success; and Israel's deep-seated anxieties are far from subsided. This "face-saving" ceasefire may only be a brief calm before the next, even greater storm.

Frequently Asked Questions

The following will address five representative questions based on the core content of the aforementioned article, presenting them in a question-and-answer format to help readers better understand the background and nature of this conflict and the interim agreement.

Question 1: Why is it said that Iran has been "wounded but not defeated"? In what specific ways is this reflected?

A: The article points out that Iran has indeed suffered severe blows to its economic and military infrastructure. For example, its military-industrial base has been damaged, its overseas assets have been frozen, and it has faced enormous international pressure for blocking the Strait of Hormuz. However, the key to its survival lies in its internal political structure: the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps not only did not fall, but further consolidated its control over power during the war, transforming from a "behind-the-scenes power holder" into "power itself." This means that Iran's core decision-making body remains stable, and its ideological and geopolitical aspirations have not disappeared due to the military strikes.

Question 2: Why can't the interim agreement truly resolve the core contradictions between the US and Iran?

A: Because the fundamental issues that led to the war—Iran's refusal to abandon its uranium enrichment activities, the United States' unwillingness to provide long-term security guarantees, and Israel's insistence on containing the existential threat posed by Iran—were all shelved in the interim agreement. The agreement is more like a stopgap measure of "ceasefire first, then discuss other things," with all parties pushing the most intractable issues to the so-called "second phase." However, analysts and historical experience suggest that this second phase is unlikely to ever truly begin. Therefore, the interim agreement only delayed the resurgence of the conflict, rather than eliminating its root causes.

Question 3: Why was the Trump administration willing to accept such an "imperfect" interim agreement?

A: The main driving forces are domestic political and economic pressures. First, Trump faces the midterm elections in November, and he needs a diplomatic "report card" to show voters that he has made progress on the Iran nuclear issue, even if it's just superficial. Second, Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has already severely impacted global financial markets and oil prices, and restoring the passage as soon as possible is in the economic interest of the United States. Furthermore, unfreezing some Iranian assets and providing limited sanctions easing can also be seen as a strategy to avoid further escalation of the situation while providing Trump with a political escape route.

Question 4: What does the interim agreement mean for Israel? Why is Israel uneasy?

A: Israel's ultimate goal is to completely contain or even destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities and regional influence. The interim agreement not only failed to force Iran to abandon uranium enrichment, but also ideologically confirmed to the Iranian leadership that the fundamental conflict with Israel cannot be resolved through an agreement. What worries Israel even more is that the agreement requires it to cease military strikes against Beirut and other locations in Lebanon, and the Revolutionary Guard may become even more powerful after the war. Therefore, Israel believes that this agreement merely postpones the next war, without eliminating the necessity for it; this "band-aid" arrangement is precisely the source of its unease.

Question 5: What is a "phase two" negotiation? Why is it unlikely to happen?

A: "Phase Two" is a common diplomatic pretext, referring to revisiting the most contentious and difficult issues after reaching a preliminary, simple ceasefire or de-escalation agreement, such as Iran's uranium enrichment rights, ballistic missile program, and US security guarantees. However, according to former diplomats and regional analysts, once a provisional agreement is signed, the domestic political focus of all parties (especially the US) shifts, and Iran uses the unfrozen funds and time to consolidate its power. At that point, no party is willing to reopen Pandora's box to touch the most sensitive core differences. Therefore, "Phase Two" is often indefinitely postponed and ultimately comes to nothing.