Even with renewed attack alerts in the Strait of Hormuz and the ongoing tensions between the US and Iran, ports in major Middle Eastern oil-producing countries have not fallen silent. On the contrary, from the east coast of Saudi Arabia to Haqqa Island in Iran, from the Qatari peninsula to the waters off the UAE, supertankers and LNG carriers are still busily berthing, loading, and departing. The latest shipping data shows that energy exports from this region have not only not stalled, but have instead exhibited a "normalized" operation under the crisis. Behind this lies both complex geopolitical calculations and the rigid driving force of the global energy supply and demand pattern. This article will use the latest data and typical ship movement patterns to reconstruct the current shipping situation around the Strait of Hormuz and analyze the delicate balance between risk and benefit for all parties involved.

I. Rastanura, Saudi Arabia: Giant oil tankers relay loading, signal stealth technology becomes commonplace

The port of Rastanura, located in eastern Saudi Arabia, is one of the world's most important oil export terminals. According to the latest shipping records provided by the London Stock Exchange Group, on Monday (June 29), a fourth very large crude carrier (VLCC) with a carrying capacity of up to two million barrels berthed at the terminal and officially began loading crude oil.

This is not an isolated incident—over the previous weekend, three similarly sized vessels completed loading and departed port. However, instead of immediately disclosing their routes, they all simultaneously switched off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders, entering a so-called "stealth navigation" state. This tactic is becoming increasingly common in the Gulf waters, with the core objective of reducing the probability of being targeted by drones or anti-ship missiles, thereby increasing survivability when passing through narrow straits.

It is worth noting that one of the tankers turned its transponder back on after leaving the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, and its course indicated it was heading to Japan, suggesting that purchasing demand from major East Asian consumer countries remains robust.

Meanwhile, two very large crude carriers (VLCCs) entered the Strait of Hormuz on Sunday and began loading operations at a designated terminal in the UAE. Saudi Aramco maintained its usual silence regarding these developments, refusing to comment on ship movements and loading arrangements. Abu Dhabi National Oil Company responded that, in accordance with corporate practice, it would not disclose the specific locations, sailing directions, or route plans of its vessels.

Second, the total volume of traffic across the Taiwan Strait has cooled down, but has rebounded significantly compared to the initial stage of the conflict.

Regarding product tankers, three vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, including two tankers carrying petroleum products and one smaller fuel tanker. Although the number of passages on that day was lower than the previous week, according to statistics from energy analysis agency Kpler, last week's traffic volume in the strait climbed to the highest point since the conflict broke out at the end of February this year—29 tankers completed the passage on June 24 alone.

However, compared to the normal daily passage level of 125 vessels before the conflict, the current shipping activity level is still significantly lower. This gap reflects both shipowners' continued assessment of risk premiums and the fact that some shipping companies are still weighing the additional costs and time losses incurred by detouring around the Cape of Good Hope or waiting for escort fleets.

III. Simultaneous Opening of Two Berths at Hargh Island, Iran: A Window of Opportunity for Shipment Under Washington's Waiver Order

Of particular note is the loading pace from Iran. Following the US government's 60-day temporary waiver of sanctions on Iranian oil exports, Iran is clearly seizing this policy window to accelerate crude oil shipments. According to Windward, a maritime news agency, on Saturday (June 27), Iran's two major export berths on Hargh Island were unusually busy loading oil simultaneously, marking the first time in nearly a week that two berths were loading in parallel.

On the same day, two very large crude carriers, the "Dan" and the "Hawk," flying the Iranian flag, entered the Strait of Hormuz. Throughout the weekend, approximately eight million barrels of crude oil from the UAE and Qatar were transported out of the Gulf via four large vessels. The National Iranian Oil Company has not yet commented, but market observers generally believe that Tehran is attempting to maximize shipments during the waiver period to alleviate its financial difficulties under sanctions.

IV. LNG shipping routes remain uninterrupted: Qatari and UAE LNG carriers are heading towards China and India.

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) transport was also not disrupted by security threats. Ship tracking data showed that on June 26, two more ships that had previously shut down their signals and were in ballast condition were spotted returning to port on the western side of the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, two other ships fully loaded with LNG had successfully left the strait, heading to India and China respectively.

Specifically, the "Mraweh," operated by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, completed loading at Das Island in the UAE on June 21 and is expected to arrive at the Dahj terminal on India's west coast on July 5. Meanwhile, the "Al Hamla," owned by Qatar Energy, loaded at Ras Raffan Port on June 18 and is scheduled to arrive at a Chinese coastal port on July 3. Qatar Energy has not yet responded immediately to email inquiries, but the normal progress of their shipping schedules demonstrates that major natural gas producing countries have not reduced their export commitments due to short-term security concerns.

V. Market Divergence: Is the Current Oil Price a "Reasonable Discount" or a "Risk Blind Spot"?

Faced with this complex situation, financial market analysts have offered drastically different interpretations. Tony Sycamore, a senior analyst at IG Markets, points out that if investors expect the Strait of Hormuz to remain "intermittently open" in the coming weeks or even months—sometimes unobstructed and sometimes disrupted—then current crude oil prices are actually in a relatively reasonable range, and may even face slight downward pressure.

However, if the localized conflicts that erupted over the weekend escalate into a wider military confrontation, then current oil prices will undoubtedly be severely undervalued, and the market will face the risk of a dramatic revaluation. This divergence precisely reflects the core contradiction in the current energy pricing mechanism—whether geopolitical risk premiums have been fully priced in or are still being selectively ignored by the market.

Conclusion: The rational choice in the eye of the storm – the exit continues, the game never ends.

In conclusion, despite the continued security uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, major oil-producing and natural gas-exporting countries in the Middle East have not chosen to halt or drastically reduce loading operations. Instead, from Saudi Arabia and Iran to Qatar and the UAE, each party is flexibly adjusting its loading schedule based on its own sanctions exemption windows, long-term supply contracts, and strategic reserve management needs. Tactical details such as "stealth" ship navigation, simultaneous operation at two berths, route detours, and restart signals collectively paint a complex picture of the energy supply chain's self-adjustment in a high-risk environment.

While the risk of short-term supply disruptions remains for the global market, actual shipment data indicates that major players are still able to maintain export flows during lulls in the fighting. The real variable lies in the next move at the political level—and this is precisely the fundamental reason why all market participants are unable to sleep soundly.

Frequently Asked Questions

Question 1: Given the frequent attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, why don't Middle Eastern oil-producing countries simply suspend shipments and wait for the situation to stabilize?

A: Suspending loading may seem like a safe approach, but the costs are actually enormous. First, oil and liquefied natural gas exports are the absolute lifeline of the fiscal revenue of countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Even a few days of shutdown would result in direct losses of billions of dollars and shake the trust of long-term customers. Second, global refineries and power plants are highly dependent on Middle Eastern crude oil and natural gas. A sudden supply disruption would cause international energy prices to skyrocket, triggering inflation and panic—consequences far greater than the localized risks of ship attacks. Therefore, oil-producing countries prefer "risk mitigation" strategies, such as turning off transponders, arranging escort fleets, and adjusting loading time windows, rather than a complete shutdown.

Question 2: Does a ship turning off its transponder and entering a "stealth" state violate international maritime regulations? Could it actually increase the risk of collisions or accidental attacks?

A: While disabling the Automatic Identification System (AIS) does not align with the International Maritime Organization's general recommendations for navigational safety, it is considered an "informal defensive measure" by many shipowners and charterers in war-torn or high-risk waters. Its purpose is not to circumvent navigation rules, but rather to prevent the ship's position from being publicly disclosed in real time, thus reducing the probability of being located and attacked by hostile armed forces. Of course, this does increase the difficulty of collision avoidance for surrounding vessels, and therefore it is usually only employed in specific narrow waters such as the Strait of Hormuz, and when within the coverage of escort formations or shore-based radar, rather than being a blind, continuous stealth operation.

Question 3: The US sanctions waiver for Iran is only for 60 days. Why is Iran speeding up the loading of oil in such a short period of time? Will the payment for this oil be settled smoothly in the end?

A: Although the 60-day window is short, it is a rare "legitimate breathing period" for Iran. During this time, importers of oil traded with Iran will not be held accountable by US secondary sanctions, so Iran must race against time to convert its floating storage and onshore inventory into actual export revenue. As for settlement, most transactions are still completed through non-dollar channels, such as in yuan, euro, or barter trade, and often through third-country banks. Contracts concluded during the exemption period, as long as the goods are shipped and leave port within the stipulated time limit, may still be successfully received even if the exemption expires, provided that the shipment does not involve US entities or the financial system.

Question 4: The current number of ships passing through the strait is far lower than the 125 ships per day before the conflict. Does this indicate that the global oil supply has been substantially damaged?

A: The decrease in traffic volume does reflect the "frictional slowdown" caused by the safety premium, but it cannot be directly equated with a supply disruption. Some tankers chose to circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope in Africa, adding about two weeks to the voyage, but this only delayed delivery times, not reduced the total volume; others waited for escort fleets or windows at both ends of the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in a momentary decrease in the number of tankers passing through. Looking at actual loading data, major terminals such as Rastanura, Hargh Island, and Das Island are still operating normally. Therefore, the total physical supply of global crude oil and LNG has not experienced a precipitous drop; rather, it is more a matter of logistical adjustments and a slowdown in shipping capacity turnover.

Question 5: LNG carriers from Qatar and the UAE are still heading to India and China. Does this mean that Asian buyers are completely unconcerned about the risks in the Straits?

A: Asian buyers aren't indifferent; rather, their energy security strategies dictate that they "must care but cannot back down." China and India are the world's second and fourth largest LNG importers, respectively, with Middle Eastern gas making up a very large proportion of their imports. In the short term, it's almost impossible to find alternative sources of equal scale and price. Therefore, importers manage risk through measures such as negotiating "force majeure" clauses in contracts, purchasing war risk insurance, and requiring sellers to provide alternative unloading ports, but they won't easily cancel orders. As long as there's no concrete signal of a complete blockade of the Strait, Chinese and Indian buyers tend to accept the goods as planned, since the industrial shutdown losses caused by a gas outage far outweigh the increase in insurance premiums.

At 09:29 Beijing time, US crude oil is currently trading at $70.23 per barrel.